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It is sometimes suggested that we have a ‘special concern’ for future selves, which is justified 
only if we accept non-reductionism concerning personal survival. As we take ourselves to be 
justified in the having of such a ‘special concern’, this suggestion has often been used to 
strengthen the plausibility of non-reductionism concerning personal survival over 
reductionism, which allegedly cannot justify the having of such a ‘special concern’.  
 
   This paper suggests that the sort of justified ‘special concern’ that non-reductionists appeal 
to is problematic, because it is incompatible with any of the coherent theories of the 
metaphysics of time and change. There is, however, another version of a justified ‘special 
concern’ which is compatible with both reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of 
personal survival. If we accept this latter version of ‘special concern’, however, then justified 
‘special concern’ can no longer make non-reductionism a more attractive account of personal 
















Writers dealing with the topic of personal survival or persistence mainly concern themselves 
with the central issues as to whether or not, and if so, by virtue of what, a single person can be 
said to survive over a period of time. This essay, while being a contribution to the subject 
matter of personal survival, nevertheless departs from the familiar trend by focusing on a 
lesser known and under-discussed topic that perhaps may have implications for the more 
fundamental principles concerning the supposed facts about personal identity over time. This 
topic revolves around the idea that each of us has a justified ‘special concern’ towards our 
future selves, a concern which is different from that towards other selves and which is also 
different from that towards our present selves.  
 
   The aim of this essay is to argue that, if the sort of ‘special concern’ as described by writers 
dealing with the issue exists, its justification, if indeed there is one, will at most be a 
derivative affair, outlining the rationality of our actions arising from the having of such 
‘special concern’, instead of it being the sort of justification which answers the question, 
“Why do we have such a ‘special concern’ for our future selves?” in a certain way. This, as 
per the considerations towards which my essay is oriented, is not a result of the internal 
incoherence of certain notions of personal identity over time, but is due to certain ideas 
concerning the metaphysics of time and change instead, which influences the way in which 
change is to be characterized, and which in turn will have repercussions for our ideas 
concerning the identity of selves over time. Where arguments over the plausibility of 
competing accounts of personal survival may still get one to the same conclusions I shall 
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make with regards to the notion of ‘special concern’, such arguments will not be considered in 
this present essay, except in an expository manner as is required to illustrate the various 
accounts of personal survival and ‘special concern’.  
 
   This essay will be divided into three main sections. The first will deal with the notion of 
‘special concern’ as it affects, and is affected by, the idea of personal survival. We will first 
take a look at various accounts of personal survival, and see how the debate concerning the 
issue of justified ‘special concern’ for our future selves is shaped by the disagreements 
between adherents to these different accounts. We shall also see different views concerning 
this ‘special concern’, as presented by various writers such as Derek Parfit, Harold Langsam 
and John Perry.  
 
   The second section of this essay will see the focus shift to the metaphysics of time and the 
notions of change and persistence. Specifically, the theories of change characterized as 
‘endurantism’ and ‘perdurantism’ will be looked at in detail, along with the views of time 
characterized as ‘presentism’, ‘endurantism’ and ‘possibilism’, as well as what I will call the 
‘Spotlight View’ of temporal presence. A tangential note will also be made concerning 
theories of change and persistence characterized as ‘three-dimensionalism’, ‘four-
dimensionalism’ and what I will call the ‘Replacement Theory’. 
 
   The last section of this essay will see a return to the topic of ‘special concern’ towards our 
future selves and the justification thereof, bearing in mind the conclusions reached at the end 
of the second section. If certain theories concerning time and change are problematic, then, it 
will be argued, certain ways of thinking about concern towards our future selves will have to 
be eliminated. However, if that is the case, then certain justificatory accounts of our having 
‘special concern’ for our future selves will have to be eliminated as well. This means that 
other accounts for there being a justified ‘special concern’ for our future selves will have to be 
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accepted instead. I will then look at how the conclusions reached at the end of the preceding 
section will affect theories of personal survival and persistence. Concluding remarks to the 





§1: Personal Survival and the ‘Special 
Concern’. 
 
Personal Survival and the ‘Special Concern’ | 








The idea of a justified ‘special concern’ towards our future selves has been discussed by 
writers discussing the topic of personal identity and survival. To get at the notion of ‘special 
concern’, we will therefore first look at the ideas of personal survival outlined by these 
writers.  
 
   Discussions concerning ‘personal survival’, or ‘personal persistence’ (I shall be treating 
these two as interchangeable terms), involve the idea of there being certain relations between 
person-stages across a period of time. To say that a person survives from the present moment 
to a future moment is to say that the same person exists at and between these moments. 
Debates over the issue of personal survival typically feature disputes over just what such 
persistence relations are, whether or not such persistence relations even exist, and whether 
anything important turns on the question of personal survival at all. For my purposes, I will 
look at competing notions of personal survival that take bodily, psychological and 
phenomenal continuity as the persistence relations which guarantee survival over time. I will 
also be outlining what is known as the ‘non-reductionist’ view of personal survival, which 
takes the persistence relation which guarantees survival over time to adhere in persons as a 
‘further fact’ which cannot be elucidated in the terms employed by the above ‘reductionist’ 
accounts. 
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I: The Bodily Continuity Thesis.  
 
If a necessary and sufficient condition of personal survival is a certain degree of bodily 
continuity, then it means that something about our physical make up guarantees the identity of 
our selves spread across a period of time. Typically, this view takes the crucial facts about our 
identity to adhere within the whole or parts of our brains. It is a generally indisputable claim 
that we can survive a certain degree of physical mutilation, which varies from trivial day-to-
day cases such as the loss of nails and hair to the more serious cases of the loss of our limbs; 
indeed, the physical human body operates throughout its lifetime like the Ship of Theseus and 
John Locke’s socks: our cells undergo a constant process of replacement as old ones die and 
fall off or are purged from our bodies, while new ones are being produced by our bodies to 
take their place. To avoid trivializing the bodily continuity thesis and to therefore block the 
objection that this thesis commits us to admit that we do not survive even the loss of a single 
hair or nail, the bodily continuity thesis should be understood as one which posits that we do 
not survive a certain degree of physical mutilation, and not that we do not survive any degree 
of physical mutilation.  
 
   The plausibility this view has borrows largely from the clinical and legal professions, where 
the stoppage of an individual’s brain activity and processes is equated with the death of that 
individual. Advances in the medical and surgical sciences have seen various forms of life 
support systems keep individuals biologically alive, even as these individuals are victims of 
serious mutilations. On the philosophical front, this view has culminated in the various ‘brain-
in-a-vat’ thought experiments, where the upper limit of the degree of mutilation is seen as the 
human brain and where personal survival is seen to be guaranteed by certain brain activities 
and processes.  
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   The significance of the human brain and its associated activities and processes, regarding 
the issue of personal survival, is further highlighted against the backdrop of other body parts 
and their associated activities and processes, when we consider another thought experiment 
which is a development of the ‘brain-in-a-vat’ ones: that involving the idea of brain 
transplant. Where we do get the sense that there is some form of survival when one’s brain is 
kept working even when the rest of her body has been obliterated, the ‘brain-in-a-vat’ thought 
experiments do not guarantee the conviction that the same person is involved when we 
consider the brains in life-sustaining fluids and the same brains embodied in a physical human 
body. This is certainly not a problem with ‘brain-in-a-vat’ thought experiments, for the 
intuitions they seek to elicit are not those concerning personal survival. Nevertheless, the idea 
that we are essentially our brains does get more support from the common intuition that while 
we certainly do not swap identities with the donors of other body parts, such as lungs and 
kidneys, we do when the replaced body part in question is the brain. 
 
   Do we actually have the intuition that the brain is crucial, concerning the question of 
personal survival, the way that other body parts are not? To illustrate the plausibility of the 
bodily continuity thesis, let us take a look at one such thought experiment involving brain 
transplant: 
“Two men, a Mr. Brown and a Mr. Robinson, had been operated on for brain 
tumours, and brain extractions had been performed on both of them. At the 
end of the operations, however, the assistant inadvertently put Brown’s brain 
in Robinson’s head, and Robinson’s brain in Brown’s head. One of the men 
immediately died, but the other, the one with Robinson’s body and Brown’s 
brain, eventually regained consciousness. Let us call the latter ‘Brownson.’”1 
What do we make of Brownson and the question concerning his identity? When he has fully 
regained consciousness he will exhibit all the character and behavioural traits that Brown used 
                                                          
1
 Shoemaker, S., Self-Knowledge and Self-Identity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1963), p. 23. 
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to have, and will remember all the past events that Brown used to experience (barring certain 
traits or memories which are incompatible with Robinson’s body, of course; for example, if 
Brown, before the operation, had a motor tic which caused his left big toe to crunch 
involuntarily, and if Robinson had had his left foot amputated prior to the operation, then 
obviously Brownson will not inherit this motor tic of Brown’s. Brownson may, however, still 
‘experience’ the tic not unlike phantom limb experiences common to amputation patients). 
Where transplant operations involving other body parts may still change certain aspects of a 
person’s behaviour (for example if Brown, who had perfect eyesight, were to receive a 
corneal transplant form Robinson, who had short-sightedness, then the resulting person who 
has Brown’s body but for the corneas, may inherit pre-operation Robinson’s habit of 
squinting), we generally do not take these changes to indicate identity changes, for the reason 
that these changes are not crucial to personal survival the way brain transplants introduce 
change. This is not to say, for sure, that such changes are not significant in any way. Multiple 
transplant operations may have life-altering effects on a person’s behaviour and character 
traits, but if a brain transplant operation is not amongst one of these operations, then we 
generally take the same person to have survived such operations. The question concerning 
personal survival is not answered by a quantitative analysis of the changes brought about by 
transplant operations, but rather a qualitative one. Owing to the Cartesian and Lockean idea 
that we are essentially thinking subjects, and as we take thinking mechanisms and processes 
as being located in the brain, the intuition that Brown survives as Brownson will naturally 
arise in most of us, for brain transplant operations bring about a certain type of physical 
change, the only type which has implications for the issue of personal survival. This version 
of the bodily continuity thesis is thus the idea that persons are inextricably tied to their brains; 
wherever their brains go, so too do they go.  
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II: The Psychological Continuity Thesis.  
 
The step taken from the bodily continuity thesis outlined above, which takes what is 
important for personal survival to adhere to the brains of persons, to the psychological 
continuity thesis to be outlined below; is a short one. Recall the plausibility of the bodily 
continuity thesis is derived from the Cartesian and Lockean notion that the essence of our 
being lies in our thoughts, which means personal survival allows for certain degrees of 
physical mutilation. The further postulate that our thoughts inhere essentially in our brains, 
however, is one which adherents to the psychological continuity thesis deny, and which 
followers of the bodily continuity thesis assert. To be certain, thought processes and 
mechanisms require some sort of (biological) platform in order to be realized. This is 
something most followers of the psychological continuity thesis do not deny. What they do 
deny, however, is the additional suggestion that thoughts necessarily belong to the brains 
which give rise to them.  
 
   The linchpin of the psychological continuity position is a certain stance taken towards 
mental events and processes: the overriding idea behind different variants of the 
psychological continuity thesis is that mind talk does not translate (or, on certain versions of 
the view, cannot be translated) to brain talk. If this is correct then it is easy to see the 
resistance of the psychological continuity thesis against a collapse into the bodily continuity 
thesis, because the driving intuition behind the latter is bolstered by mind talk anyway. 
Cartesian and Lockean theories of the mind posit the essence of persons to lie in 
consciousness, with the physical platforms which realize consciousness being practically 
required but inessential. An example to illustrate this moral is the functionalist theory of 
consciousness: the mind is related to the body (in most cases, the brain) in a form-function 
manner, which means that the physical brain is that which realizes mental events and 
processes, events and processes which require some platform for their realization, but not any 
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one particular platform for this realization necessarily. Hence, the idea is that other physical 
platforms can replace a particular brain in instantiating the effects brought about by a 
particular mind, without affecting the identity of the person involved, as the mantra here is 
now ‘wherever their minds go, so too do they go’ instead. So long as the input-output 
mechanism of the replacement physical system is adequate for realizing the mental events and 
processes, it can serve as the new physical embodiment of the person. The necessity 
characterizing the functionalist position is that between the types of form and function, and 
not between particular tokens of such forms and functions. Certain sorts of mental events and 
processes require by necessity certain sorts of physical embodiment (for example it may seem 
impossible that a human being’s mental events and processes be instantiated, without loss, in 
a rat’s brain, owing to the complexity of the former, and the simplicity of the latter), but 
particular physical platforms are conjoined to particular mental events and processes only 
accidentally (for example it seems possible that a particular human being’s mental events and 
processes be instantiated in another human being’s brain2). What is important to personal 
survival, therefore, are just the mental events and processes which characterize the Cartesian 
and Lockean theories of the mind, and not the squishy brain bits which are merely the 
physical embodiments of these events and processes.  
 
   This difference between the psychological continuity thesis and the bodily continuity thesis 
can be illustrated by another set of thought experiments, made popular by science fiction 
novels and films: those involving the notion of teletransportation. Below is such a scenario:  
“After a long and successful career as a subversive, you have finally been 
apprehended by the authorities, who are eager to interrogate you about your 
                                                          
2
 This is of course again subject to certain boundary conditions. As illustrated in the example of the 
motor tic above, mutatis mutandis, the replacement brain should not be too different from the brain it is 
supposed to replace. As Bernard Williams rightly points out, even a gender mismatch between the two 
may cause serious problems: “if the [person and her replacement body and/or brain] were extremely 
unlike one another both physically and psychologically, and if, say, in addition, they were of different 
sex, there might be grave difficulties in reading [the person’s] dispositions in any possible 
performances of [the replacement’s] body [and/or brain].” from Williams, B., “The Self and Future”, 
from Philosophical Review, LXXIX(2) (1970), p. 161. 
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accomplices. Unfortunately for you, the authorities in question prefer to use 
traditional methods: brutal but effective physical torture. You are informed 
that in order to avoid leaving incriminating marks on your body, you will be 
relocated in a different body; the torture will then be carried out; you will be 
returned to your original (and unblemished) body once a satisfactory 
confession has been extracted. Thanks to recent neuro-technical advances, 
the body-transfer no longer requires a brain-transplant: a brain-state transfer 
device will do the job instead. This machine is able to copy the psychological 
states (memories, beliefs, intentions, personality traits, and so on) from one 
brain to another brain. A helmet is placed on your head, and the switches are 
thrown. You wake up. Although a little nauseous, and clearly in a different 
body, you feel very much like your usual self. The torture, when it comes, is 
as bad as you feared.”3 
The above scenario mirrors the Brown-Robinson thought experiment but for one explicit 
difference: in the stead of a brain transplant is a ‘brain-state transfer device’ which means that 
the process will involve a wholesale ‘body-swapping’, instead of the previous body-swapping 
but for the brains of the individuals involved. The crux of the psychological continuity thesis, 
which the above thought experiment illustrates, thus lies in the idea that only brain states are 
significant when we consider the question concerning personal survival, instead of the brains 
themselves. Various versions of the psychological continuity thesis thus contend over just 
which brain states matter when we consider personal survival, with the candidates ranging 
from certain sets of memories to certain dispositional characteristics.  
 
   An example of a psychological continuity account of personal survival is that provided by 
Derek Parfit. He believes that, across a period of time, two different kinds of psychological 
relations adhere between a person and her surviving self, the first being ‘psychological 
                                                          
3
 Dainton, B. and Bayne, T., “Consciousness as a Guide to Personal Persistence”, from Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, 83(4) (2005), p. 551. 
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connectedness’, which is “the holding of particular direct psychological connections,”4 and 
the second being ‘psychological continuity’, which is “the holding of overlapping chains of 
strong connectedness.”5 What are the mentioned ‘psychological connections’ then? They are 
the connections which obtain, for example, between memories and the experiences which 
give rise to them, intentions and the acts in which the intentions are carried out, beliefs and 
desires. These connections are important to the question concerning personal survival because 
they are just the ingredients in making up Cartesian and Lockean selves. Just the existence of 
psychological connections, however, is not sufficient for personal survival, because such 
connections hold to a matter of degree, and also because psychological connectedness is not 
transitive, whereas personal survival is transitive.  
 
   With regards to the point concerning degree, Parfit points out that between any two persons 
today and tomorrow there can be a variance in the amount of psychological connections. If A 
told B today that she desires an ice-cream, and B purchases one for her tomorrow, then there 
is a psychological connection between A’s desire and B’s action, but this obviously does not 
therefore mean that B tomorrow survives A today. For there to be survival, it must be the case 
that enough psychological connections obtain between the persons involved. So, although A 
today shares a psychological connection with B tomorrow, A today is connected to A 
tomorrow to a higher degree, and the same goes for B today and B tomorrow. Just what 
counts as enough, however, is perhaps a matter involving the Sorites paradox which I shall 
not go into here.6 Suffice it to say that, when there are enough direct connections, there is 
what Parfit calls strong connectedness, which goes halfway towards getting at a criterion of 
personal survival. 
 
                                                          
4
 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 206. 
5
 Ibid.  
6
 Parfit himself says “we cannot plausibly define precisely what counts as enough. But we can claim 
that there is enough connectedness if the number of connections, over any day, is at least half the 
number of direct connections that hold, over every day, in the lives of nearly every actual person.” from 
ibid. For a comprehensive bibliography of literature on the concept of vagueness and the Sorites 
paradox see http://www.btinternet.com/~justin.needle/bib.htm.  
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   The other half comes from Parfit’s point regarding transitivity. If A survives B and B 
survives C, then A must survive C as well. However, if A is (strongly) connected to B and B 
is (strongly) connected to C, it may still be the case that A is not (strongly) connected to C. 
This disjoint between the notions of personal survival and psychological connectedness may 
be made clear by a commonplace example: I am the same person as who I was 20 years ago, 
but I may not be able to remember much of what I was like 20 years ago, much less be 
(strongly) connected psychologically to who I was 20 years ago. Psychological 
connectedness, strong or otherwise, must therefore be insufficient for personal survival. 
Parfit’s way of resolving this insufficiency is to point out that, where I may not be (strongly) 
connected psychologically to myself 20 years ago, I am nevertheless strongly connected 
psychologically to myself 5 years ago, having roughly the same set of beliefs and desires. 
Who I was 5 years ago is in turn strongly connected psychologically to who I was 10 years 
ago, who in turn is strongly connected psychologically to who I was 15 years ago, who in turn 
is strongly connected psychologically to who I was 20 years ago. Where direct strong 
psychological relations do not hold between a person and her distant past self, overlapping 
chains of such strong relations do hold, and these overlaps are, or the obtaining of 
psychological continuity is, that which account(s) for personal survival. So even though I may 
not be psychologically connected to all my past selves due to a breakdown in transitivity and 
as some of them are too far back in the past, I am nevertheless psychologically continuous 
with them, and this transitive relation I have with all my past selves thus serves, for Parfit, as 
the necessary and sufficient criterion for personal survival.  
 
   One may refuse to take the step from the bodily continuity thesis to the psychological 
continuity thesis, however, even if she shares the Cartesian and Lockean intuitions concerning 
personal identity with defenders of the latter thesis. This is because not everyone may regard 
the notion of teletransportation as being possible. A plausible analysis of the above scenario 
involving the brain-state transfer device may be that wholesale brainwashing may have been 
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inflicted on the person who still survives in her body across the moments before and after the 
activation of the brain-state transfer device. Below is a thought experiment motivating the 
plausibility of this view:  
“Your long and successful career as a subversive is about to end: you realize 
that your arrest is imminent. You also know what to expect when 
apprehended: brutal torture. Your collaborators tell you not to worry. They 
have got their hands on a brain-state transfer device. They tell you that 
thanks to this device, when the torture commences your brain will no longer 
house your memories, beliefs or personality traits. Your psychology will be 
put into storage, and your brain will be imprinted with a psychology copied 
from someone wholly ignorant of your doings. You are not greatly consoled 
by this prospect. Having a different set of beliefs and memories will surely 
not prevent you feeling the pain inflicted on your body. How could it? At 
best, if your own memories and beliefs are restored, you will not be able to 
remember the pain, but this will do nothing to alleviate it when it is inflicted. 
If you follow the advice of your well-meaning friends, it seems you will face 
a double trauma: torture compounded with drastic psychological 
manipulation – a complete brainwashing.”7 
This analysis of just what a brain-state transfer device accomplishes borrows its plausibility 
from the idea that we can and sometimes even do survive massive psychological upheavals, 
be they be in terms of memories or dispositional characteristics. For example, we typically 
regard amnesia patients and lunatics in the vein of George IV to have survived their 
afflictions, even though there may be little, if any, psychological continuity of any sort 
inhering in the persons pre- and post- said afflictions. If we have such notions involving 
personal survival and psychological discontinuities, then what the psychological continuity 
thesis asserts about personal survival cannot therefore be true. If, furthermore, our intuitions 
                                                          
7
 Dainton and Bayne, op. cit. p. 551-552. 
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are strongly aligned in accordance with the analysis of the Brown-Robinson thought 
experiment as presented earlier, then our conclusion will be that the teletransportation 
analysis has begged the question against the bodily continuity thesis, not undermined it, and 
that we should regard the brain-state transfer device as merely being capable of bringing 
about a total brainwash, as illustrated in the second thought experiment involving the brain-
state transfer device above. 
 
   The disagreements between the defenders of the bodily continuity and psychological 
continuity theses are many, and I shall not concern myself with the details of these 
disagreements except when these details affect the issue of ‘special concern’ to be discussed 
later. The above disagreement is mentioned, however, because it opens the door for two other 
sorts of view concerning personal survival: the phenomenal continuity thesis which takes 
personal survival to consist in facts about the phenomenal as opposed to the psychological 
makeup of persons, and the ‘further fact’ or ‘non-reductionist’ view which posits the answer 
to puzzles concerning personal survival as being a further fact about persons, over and above 
their bodily and/or psychological continuities, if any such continuities exist in the first place. 
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III: The Phenomenal Continuity Thesis and the ‘Further Fact’ 
View. 
 
The bodily continuity and psychological continuity theses outlined above are examples of 
what Parfit calls ‘reductionist’ accounts of personal survival. This is because, according to 
Parfit, they reduce talk concerning personal survival to talk concerning impersonal, extrinsic 
relations between objects, events or states of affairs. So long as enough of such relations hold 
between two individuals across a period of time, then the latter individual is the same person 
as the earlier one, and has survived the earlier individual. This is contrasted with ‘non-
reductionist’ accounts which posit the facts of personal survival to be found in certain 
intrinsic properties of the persons or of some objects, events and states of affairs involved, 
facts on top of those regarding conditions of continuity as posited by reductionist accounts of 
personal survival, which are not necessary and/or sufficient for personal survival.  
 
   Why is there a need, however, for other accounts? What is wrong with the psychological 
and bodily continuity accounts outlined in the previous subsections? The answer has already 
been suggested in these sub-sections. Recall the disagreement between adherents of the bodily 
continuity account and those of the psychological continuity account over just what a brain 
state transfer device is capable of. If we agree with the adherents of the bodily continuity 
account that a person can survive psychological discontinuities, and also agree with the 
adherents of the psychological continuity account that a person can survive physical 
mutilation, by seeing both complete brainwashing and teletransportation as plausible episodes 
of personal survival, then we are faced with what is known as the ‘Williams conundrum’8: 
faced with different descriptions of the same putative scenario of brain state transfer, our 
intuitions concerning personal survival are pulled in completely different directions. If we 
                                                          
8
 See Williams, op. cit. for his exposition and attempted resolution of this conundrum. 
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agree that persons can survive both complete brainwashing and teletransportation, then our 
intuitions are telling us that neither psychological nor bodily continuity is necessary for 
personal survival. This means that personal survival must consist in some other fact about 
persons over and above the facts relating to the psychological and bodily continuities of 
person-stages. This means one of two things: that personal survival consists in some other 
class(es) of reductionist facts outside of facts about bodily and psychological continuity, or 
that reductionist accounts simply all fall short of providing us with necessary and sufficient 
conditions for personal survival, and that personal survival must depend on a further fact apart 
from those suggested by the incomplete reductionist accounts. The phenomenal continuity 
thesis is an example of the former sort of response to the Williams conundrum, while the 
‘bare locus’ view is an example of the latter.  
 
   First, however, let us take a look at the contrast between impersonality and extrinsic 
relations on the one hand, and intrinsic properties on the other, as mentioned above as being 
operative in separating the reductionist from the non-reductionist accounts concerning 
personal survival. Reductionist accounts are so named because they posit that facts about 
personal survival can be completely reduced to other facts such as those about certain bodily 
and/or psychological continuities. The notion of personhood is not seen to be accorded any 
metaphysical status over and above these other facts: a complete metaphysical picture of the 
world can be drawn without having to invoke the notion of personhood, because these other 
facts will exhaust descriptions of the metaphysical states of affairs involved in talk concerning 
persons and their survival. It is in this sense that reductionist accounts are described as 
‘impersonal’. In contrast, non-reductionist accounts of personal survival all take the idea of 
personhood to consist of metaphysical states of affairs over and above psychological and/or 
bodily continuities. Persons thus constitute a separate category in the ontological furniture of 
the world, and a complete description of the world in metaphysical terms will have to include 
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facts about persons and their survival, over and above facts about bodily and psychological 
continuities.  
 
   Another way to look at this contrast between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of 
personal survival is to look at the difference between intrinsic properties and extrinsic 
relations. Intrinsic properties are those which something has if that something has that 
property even if nothing else exists in the world, while extrinsic relations outline the ways in 
which something interacts with other things in the world.9 With this distinction in place, we 
can now describe the difference between reductionist and non-reductionist accounts of 
personal persistence in another way. Psychological and bodily continuities, which the 
reductionist accounts we have looked at appeal to when outlining necessary and sufficient 
conditions for personal survival, are paradigmatic examples of extrinsic relations. Whether or 
not someone survives across a period of time, according to these accounts, depends on 
whether or not the right relationships obtain between a set of psychological and/or physical 
states at the beginning of that period of time and another set of such states at the terminal 
point of that period of time. To say that a person survives across this period of time, therefore, 
is just to describe the successful holding of certain extrinsic relations between successive 
person-stages, and nothing else. Non-reductionist accounts, however, posit that the above 
description is incomplete, for the holding of extrinsic relations of any kind is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for personal survival. Personal survival, on such accounts, depends 
crucially on the instantiation of a further fact, a fact over and above those having to do with 
how person-stages are extrinsically related across time. Whether or not someone survives 
across a period of time depends on whether or not s/he possesses the same intrinsic property 
                                                          
9
 This is, of course, just a rough working distinction, as many have pointed out already the many 
problems with thinking about this distinction, or even if a distinction can be coherently drawn in the 
first place. I am assuming here that there is such a distinction. For more on the issues concerning 
intrinsic properties and extrinsic relations see, for example, Kim, J., “Psychophysical Supervenience”, 
from Philosophical Studies, 41 (1982), pp. 51-70; Langton R. and Lewis, D., “Defining ‘Intrinsic’”, 
from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 58 (1998), pp. 333-345; and Weatherson, B., 
“Intrinsic Properties and Combinatorial Principles”, from Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 
63 (2001), pp. 365-380. 
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which guarantees her/his personhood over that period of time. Combined with the above 
restatement of this distinction in terms of impersonality, non-reductionist accounts of personal 
survival suggest that, because talk of personal survival cannot be reduced to talk of 
continuities suggested by the reductionists regarding personal survival, due to persons 
constituting a separate ontological category from the entities already accounted for in 
descriptions of the world using the ideas of continuities such as those of a physical or 
psychological nature; the facts of personal survival cannot just be the facts about the extrinsic 
relations between entities, as suggested by reductionist accounts. Instead, we must think of 
personal survival as involving further facts concerning certain intrinsic properties of 
individual persons.  
 
   Having investigated the difference between reductionism and non-reductionism with 
regards to personal survival, we are now in a good position to understand the reductionist 
response to the Williams conundrum, which takes the form of the phenomenal continuity 
thesis. This thesis claims that it is persons’ phenomenal, not psychological or physical, lives 
which are at stake when considering the question of personal survival. Hence, the elements 
under consideration when we evaluate a person’s survival across a period of time are 
phenomenal states, and the binding element between disparate phenomenal states which 
guarantees continuity and hence survival is also phenomenal in nature: the ‘experienced 
togetherness’10 which accompanies various phenomenal states in a single experiencing 
subject, or a felt co-consciousness which exists between these different states.  
 
   What, however, are phenomenal states? These are states which are experiential in nature, 
with a ‘what-it-feels-like’ component to them. Examples of such states are colours, tastes, 
smells, sounds and tactile sensations such as pains; qua experienced states, and not taking into 
account how these experiences factor into other matters such as our dispositional 
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 Dainton and Bayne, op. cit. p. 554. 
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characteristics. This means that there is a distinction to be drawn between phenomenal and 
psychological states. A memory, for example, on the psychological continuity thesis has as a 
crucial characteristic its connection to the experience of which it is a memory, but on the 
phenomenal continuity theorist’s construal, the same memory exists only as the remembered 
experiences and sensations. Hence, where a memory of a red apple is important for the 
psychological continuity thesis with regards to the initial event of the seeing of the red apple, 
the same memory is important for the phenomenal continuity thesis with regards to the 
experiential aspects of the remembered red apple itself, such as the redness, shape, size, smell 
and taste of the red apple as of the time it is being remembered. These phenomenal states may 
have causal roles to play with regards to our dispositional characteristics, but such 
characteristics do not factor into the account when considering personal survival, apart from 
their phenomenal content such as the phenomenal aspects of anger in a person which is 
triggered as a result of her seeing red objects.  
 
   The continuity of phenomenal states is also different from that of psychological states. 
Recall that psychological states are continuous if there are overlapping chains of strongly 
connected intermediate states between them. Connectedness on the psychological continuity 
thesis follows, as we have seen, a largely causal nature, being a matter of the links which hold 
between memories and the experiences which give rise to them, intentions and the acts in 
which the intentions are carried out, beliefs and desires. Phenomenal continuity is different in 
that it is built upon another connectedness relation: phenomenal connectedness. This is the 
‘experienced togetherness’ we undergo when faced with a myriad of phenomenal experiences, 
the ‘unity-within-consciousness’ which is an experienced connection we feel on top of our 
conscious experiences of the individual phenomenal items existing in our consciousness at 
any one point of time. These experienced connections, however, do not last beyond the 
‘specious present’, or that period of time in which we are aware of our experiences, before 
they become memories or pass out of our consciousness altogether. Personal survival on this 
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account thus cannot be based on phenomenal connectedness. Instead, it is based on 
phenomenal continuity, or the relation which holds when there are overlapping chains of 
direct phenomenal connectedness between any two temporally disparate phenomenal states. A 
person, on the phenomenal continuity thesis, is a stream of consciousness, which consists of 
“any collection of experiences whose simultaneous members are related by synchronic 
phenomenal connectedness, and whose non-simultaneous members are related by phenomenal 
continuity.”11 
 
   The phenomenal continuity thesis is a reductionist account of personal persistence because 
it posits that the relationships between different phases in individual streams of consciousness 
are all that matter when it comes to the question concerning personal survival. Even though 
the relationships are not causal in nature in the same sense the extrinsic relations between 
person-stages on both the bodily and psychological continuity theses are, they are 
nevertheless extrinsic and impersonal. This is because nothing in each individual phase of a 
stream of consciousness tells us which other phases it is connected to or continuous with: how 
can something in a phase of a stream of consciousness at a particular moment of time 
guarantee the past and future phases to which the phase was or will be related to, because the 
past phases are no more, and the future phases are yet to be? The question as to whether or not 
a phase in a stream of consciousness at a certain point in time is one which has survived a 
phase at an earlier point in time is answered by considering the question as to whether or not 
the latter phase is phenomenally continuous with the earlier one. This means that facts about 
personal survival, on the phenomenal continuity thesis, completely reduce to facts about the 
phenomenal continuity between distinct phases in streams of consciousness, where 
phenomenal continuity, if it holds, is an extrinsic and impersonal relation between these 
phases. If the relation of phenomenal continuity is not impersonal, this will mean that 
questions about the personal survival of the subject between the two points of time at question 
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has to be answered before we can answer the question as to whether or not the relation of 
phenomenal continuity holds between the two relevant phases. This is clearly putting the cart 
before the horse, on the phenomenal continuity account, and so cannot be part of the 
phenomenal continuity thesis.  
 
   We can now see how the phenomenal continuity thesis resolves the Williams conundrum. 
Faced with different descriptions of the same putative scenario of brain state transfer, we may 
agree that both teletransportation and complete brainwash are viable outcomes, but what this 
shows is not that we have a confused notion of personal survival by thinking that conflicting 
accounts are equally valid, but that the accounts under consideration do not exhaust 
reductionist approaches to the question concerning personal persistence. Both psychological 
and bodily continuity are insufficient for personal survival, and this is why we can agree that 
persons can survive both psychological and bodily discontinuities as per the suggestions of 
teletransportation and total brainwash. In considering just what a brain state transfer device is 
capable of, we do not know which suggestion to favour, because the scenarios are under-
described: they leave the reader in the dark as to where the stream of consciousness of the 
subject flows as the device is activated. If the subject’s stream of consciousness is continued 
in another body then we may agree that teletransportation has taken place. On the other hand, 
if the subject’s stream of consciousness remains in the same body while the beliefs and 
memories of the subject are transferred to another body, then, according to the phenomenal 
continuity thesis, it is clear that a total brainwash will be the correct description of the 
scenario. Once the flow of the stream of consciousness is charted, the phenomenal continuity 
theorist contends, Williams’ cases confound us no more.  
 
   On the other hand, non-reductionists think that cases such as the Williams conundrum 
demonstrate the fact that reductionists are fundamentally mistaken in their approach to the 
subject of personal survival. The various continuities that reductionists posit are not 
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conditions which guarantee survival over time, because personal survival is a ‘further fact’ 
over and above facts about the various continuities which hold between person-stages. Talk of 
personal survival cannot be reduced to talk of any of the extrinsic relations which exist 
between person-stages because whether a person survives across a period of time or not is not 
something which is entailed by these relations person-stages instantiate, and so these extrinsic 
relations which make up continuity conditions for the reductionists are of no help in 
determining whether or not a person has survived over time. Persons, on the non-reductionist 
view, are, as Parfit calls them, ‘separately existing entities’12, so named because they 
constitute an ontological category we cannot discount from the ontological furniture of the 
universe if we are to fully describe this universe. These separately existing entities can take 
the forms of ‘bare loci’ of physicality, mentation and sensation, corresponding to the 
reductionist ideas that the physical body, psychological makeup, and phenomenal life have 
significant importance in determining whether or not a person has survived over time. This is 
what is known as the ‘bare locus view’: persons are bare loci of physicality, mentation, 
sensation, or of any of a complex of the three, or of none of them; the facts about these bare 
loci are hence the further facts which crucially relate to our survival over and above those 
inessential ones having to do with bodily, psychological and phenomenal continuity. 
 
   What, however, are these bare loci, if facts about them are not exhausted by facts about 
bodily, psychological and phenomenal continuity? It is instructive to look at the example of 
what it means to be a bare locus of mentation, as part of a non-reductionist account of 
personal survival first brought up by Mark Johnston.13 Since persons are equated with neither 
the body nor the mind, and taking into account Cartesian and Lockean insights into the close 
relationship between persons and their minds, the suggestion is that persons are therefore bare 
loci of mentation, or entities ontologically separate from, but which possess and make 
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 Parfit, op. cit. p. 210. Parfit himself distinguishes the ‘further fact’ view from the view that persons 
are ‘separately existing entities’, but the differences between the two positions are too minor for my 
purposes in this paper.  
13
 See Johnston, M., “Human Beings”, from The Journal of Philosophy, 84(2) (1987), pp. 59-83. 
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possible, the psychological elements which make up the mental lives of the persons. The form 
a bare locus takes, however, is neither some critical portion of the brain, nor some mental 
faculty or basic set of memories and dispositional characteristics. This is to allow for the 
possibility of radical bodily and psychological discontinuities in the lives of persons, as per 
the concession that persons can survive such discontinuities, given a non-reductionist 
response to the Williams conundrum. The facts about bare loci of mentation are hence the 
further facts which crucially relate to our survival over and above those inessential ones 
having to do with bodily and psychological continuity. Mutatis mutandis, bare loci of 
physicality and sensation will be that which transcend and make possible the instantiation of 
continuity relations of a bodily or phenomenal nature, respectively. Whether we think of 
personal survival to relate closely to physical, psychological or phenomenal facts, there can 
be a non-reductionist answer to these sentiments, by way of bare loci which make possible the 
adhering of such facts.  There can also be bare loci of more than one class of these facts, 
which means that such loci are responsible for the instantiation of more than one form of 
continuity relations. For example, a view which takes both bodily and psychological relations 
to be of equal importance when it comes to persons can take personal survival to be a matter 
of the persistence of bare loci which make possible the instantiation of both physical and 
psychological relations between person-stages.  
 
   What is important about, and what is the linchpin of, the bare locus view, however, is that 
bodily, psychological and phenomenal continuity are all not necessary for personal survival. 
Physical, mental and phenomenal facts may well be important ingredients in the continued 
existence of persons, but on the non-reductionist view, they are not necessary. Instead, what is 
necessary will be the persistence of the bare loci which make possible the instantiation of 
such facts. This is how the non-reductionist responds to the Williams conundrum: we have 
intuitions which inform us that persons can survive radical discontinuities on the physical, 
psychological and phenomenal front, because the physical, psychological and phenomenal 
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facts about a person do not exhaust all the facts we have to know in determining whether or 
not that person has survived over and across a period of time. What is needed is additional 
information concerning the bare locus of physicality, mentation and/or sensation which is the 
separately existing entity that is essential to the person’s persistence. Williams’s examples are 
not a problem for the bare locus view because personal survival is a further fact other than 
those having to do with reductionist continuity relations: the choice between 
teletransportation and wholesale brainwashing is to be decided once, and if we can, find out 
the location(s) of the relevant bare locus or loci after the activation of the brain-state transfer 
device. 
Personal Survival and the ‘Special Concern’ | 
Page 27 | 
 
IV. Justifying ‘Special Concern’. 
 
As per the above divide between the reductionist and non-reductionist ways of cashing out 
just what personal survival consists in, there are plausibly two ways of elucidating how we 
can be said to have a justified ‘special concern’ towards our future selves, a concern which we 
do not have towards other selves. As for just what this concern consists in, there is little 
debate. The disagreement is rather over how it is that we can be said to be justified in having 
this sort of concern towards our future selves.  
 
   What, however, does this ‘special concern’ consist in then? It is a special class of concern 
that we can have only to certain (on most accounts, our own) future selves, and not to other 
future selves. This concern, however, is not distinguished from others by a matter of degree, 
for it may sometimes be less intense than other sorts of concerns we may have towards other 
persons, but is rather of a distinctive type which cannot be extended towards other selves. An 
example may be helpful in describing this class of concern:  
“I have to go to the dentist tomorrow, where I know I shall suffer great pain. 
I am very concerned about this terrible pain: I anxiously anticipate it, I lie 
awake at night worrying about it, I think up schemes for avoiding it. Of 
course many other people will suffer great pains tomorrow, pains far worse 
than the ones I shall feel. And as a good, decent person, I of course am also 
concerned about these other people and their pains. But I am more concerned 
about my future pain, or at least I am specially concerned about it. And I take 
myself to have good reasons for this special concern. In other words, I take 
myself to have a reason to be concerned about my future pain that is not a 
reason to be concerned about other people’s future pains. Moreover, I do not 
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doubt that many other people have special concern for their own future pains, 
and similarly regard themselves as justified to be so concerned.”14 
As seen from the above example, this concern is not distinguished by degree. A mother may 
feel very much concerned by her child’s visit to the dentist the next day, even more so than 
she is concerned by her own turn on the dentist chair following her child’s appointment, but 
there is still a sense in which she is concerned with her own future pain unlike the intense 
worry and anxiety she feels towards what the dentist is going to be doing to her child. In fact, 
there is no way which she can direct this special sort of worry and anxiety away from her own 
future pains and towards her child’s future pains instead.  This is because, in personal survival 
talk, her child’s future self and her present self do not constitute one single person, and this 
special concern can only be had when the present person experiencing the pain and the future 
person worrying over the experience of the pain are believed by the present person to be the 
same surviving person.  
 
   Assuming that we all do have this special concern on occasion towards our future selves and 
no other future selves, the question that is to follow is whether this kind of concern is ever 
justified. It is with regards to responses to this question that the adherents to the non-
reductionist accounts of personal survival have occasion to disagree with the defenders of the 
reductionist accounts of personal survival, because, according to the former, the latter cannot 
justify any such concern, because the persistence conditions outlined by the latter are 
incompatible with the justification of such a class of concern. And if we believe that we all do 
have this special concern towards our future selves and are more willing to amend the 
technicalities to our account of personal survival (which, admittedly, are further removed 
from our lives than the conviction that our future selves do matter in a special way to us such 
that we want to continue thinking ourselves as being justified in holding this special concern 
and acting on them), then it seems that we should all convert to the non-reductionist way of 
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 Langsam, H., “Pain, Personal Identity, and the Deep Further Fact”, from Erkenntnis, 54 (2001), p. 
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thinking, with regards to the issue of personal survival. This argument can be set up as 
follows: 
P1: If the reductionist account of personal survival is true, then we do not 
have a justified special concern towards our future selves.  
P2:  We do have a justified special concern towards our future selves. 
C1: Therefore, the reductionist account of personal survival is not true 
(P1, P2). 
What reason, however, do the defenders of the non-reductionist accounts of personal survival 
have for thinking that P1 is true? This can be seen when we consider the nature of the 
persistence conditions offered by the defenders of the reductionist accounts of personal 
survival. Recall earlier that such accounts posit the holding of certain extrinsic relations to be 
crucial to personal survival. What guarantees if one person-stage is survived by another is, for 
example, what guarantees psychological continuity. A future person will be the same person 
as my present self if that person will have memories of my present experiences, actions 
flowing from my present intentions, and so on, and such connections and their overlaps will 
guarantee the survival of my present to my future self. Yet how is any such connection, or an 
aggregate thereof, sufficient to ground a special concern in future selves? How will, for 
example, the fact that some future self will have memories of my present experiences while 
experiencing a world of pain in my dentist’s office ground special worry and anxiety in me 
now? Note that it is here an illegitimate move to respond that such connections and continuity 
ground special concern for future selves because they ensure personal survival, for the test 
presented by the idea of a special concern is directed towards candidates for persistence 
conditions, and any response of this sort will be begging the question against the non-
reductionist accounts of personal survival.  
 
   Nor is it of any help if we appeal to the phenomenal continuity thesis for a comeback to the 
above argument. Even though the phenomenal continuity thesis is radically different from 
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both the bodily and psychological continuity theses in that what guarantees continuity are not 
causal powers but are rather experiential in nature, what guarantees personal survival are still 
extrinsic relations between different person-stages. An earlier person-stage, on the 
phenomenal continuity thesis, may be characterized as being part of the same stream of 
consciousness as a latter person-stage, but what is important is that they are still distinct parts 
in the stream, albeit related phenomenally. This is why it does not matter to the above 
argument whether the connectedness relation between person-stages are phenomenal or causal 
in nature: the person-stages are distinct, and there is seemingly no justified reason for an 
earlier person-stage to be concerned in a special way with a distinct, latter, person-stage. 
Insofar as there seems to be no justified reason for being specially concerned towards some 
distinct future self who will have all the memories of my present experiences, hence having 
all of my present experiences as part of his causal history, there also seems to be no justified 
reason for being specially concerned towards some equally distinct future self who will have 
all of my present experiences as part of his experiential history.  
 
   The non-reductionists concerning personal survival, on the other hand, suggest a way out of 
the above problem facing the reductionists concerning personal survival with regards to the 
issue of being specially concerned towards one’s future selves. The reason reductionists 
concerning personal survival are unable to ground a justification for bearing a special concern 
towards future selves is that they posit extrinsic relations to be what matters for personal 
survival, and extrinsic relations only hold between distinct entities. On the non-reductionist 
views of personal survival, however, what matters for personal survival are intrinsic 
properties. Intrinsic properties, as we have seen in the characterization in the previous sub-
section, are that which something has even if there is nothing else in the world but for that 
something. This means that intrinsic properties can only be had by the same entity, and not 
something which is shared by distinct entities. The bare locus view which we have seen in the 
previous subsection holds that bare loci of some sort underlie personal survival, and are that 
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which guarantee survival over and above any extrinsic relations that physical bodies, mental 
entities and phases in streams of consciousness bear to one another. Latter person-stages are 
seen to survive earlier ones by virtue of housing the same bare loci which remain unchanged 
even as the physical, psychological and phenomenal aspects of the person have changed. Bare 
loci are therefore the entities which possess properties intrinsic to their being, and are that 
which ground a justification for the possession of a special concern towards one’s future 
selves. Going back to the example of my dentist visit, I am justified in being specially 
concerned for my future self in the dentist chair tomorrow because I house the same bare 
locus of physicality, mentation and/or sensation as my future self in the dentist chair 
tomorrow. The worries and anxieties I am currently afflicted with, as well as the painful 
sensations I will experience tomorrow, are all related to the same, unchanging bare locus. As 
my future experiences will be had by the same entity which is part of me now, rather than be 
felt by an entity completely distinct from, albeit closely related to, my present self; I am 
justified in being specially concerned thinking about these future experiences.  
 
   Adherents to the reductionist accounts of personal survival have, in the light of the above, 
bitten the bullet and gone on record to say that we do not then have a justification for any 
special concern for our future selves. As we are only extrinsically related to our future selves, 
and these relations cannot give us a reason to be specially worried and anxious about our 
future pains and suffering, these worries and anxieties, if they exist at all, are unjustified. 
Derek Parfit himself famously made this assertion: “when I ceased to believe the Non-
Reductionist View, I became less concerned about my own future,”15 precisely because there 
is no justification for having his sort of concern to be found on the reductionist framework 
and there is at least some normative force in getting rid of concerns which are unjustified. 
This line of response can be seen when we take the reductionist appraisal of the argument set 
out above, and modifying it to read like this:  
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 Parfit, op. cit. p. 308. 
Personal Survival and the ‘Special Concern’ | 
Page 32 | 
 
P1: If the reductionist account of personal survival is true, then we do not 
have a justified special concern towards our future selves.  
P3: The reductionist account of personal survival is true. 
C2: Therefore, we do not have a justified special concern towards our 
future selves (P1, P3).  
As can be seen, a defender of the reductionist account of personal survival such as Parfit can 
agree with adherents to the non-reductionist view concerning personal survival that a 
justificatory account of special concern for our future pains is incompatible with a 
reductionist account of personal survival being true, but arrive at a different conclusion than 
the non-reductionists regarding personal survival on the issue of special concern for our future 
selves in a classic case of ‘one man’s modus ponens is another man’s modus tollens.’ 
 
   This response, however, should be taken with a pinch of salt as there is still a way whereby 
a justification can be given for the possession of special concern towards one’s future selves, 
even if one is a reductionist with regards to personal survival. This justification differs from 
the one given by the non-reductionists concerning personal survival in that it refers not to the 
justification in the adoption of a certain attitude of worry and anxiety towards one’s future 
pains, but to a justification in acting in appropriate ways upon being afflicted by a special type 
of anxiety or worry. This means that ‘concern’ is understood here in a derivative sense: I 
possess a certain sort of concern if I act or intend to act in certain ways, and this concern is 
justified if I have a good reason to act or intend to act in these certain ways.  
 
   How then are we justified in having a special concern towards our future selves on this 
construal? The account starts with my being afflicted with worries and anxieties towards my 
pains in the dentist chair tomorrow. These worries and anxieties are directed towards the 
future, but have their existence in the present: they are affecting me right now as I am having 
them. One way I can allay my current fears and worries is to have a plan to alter the state of 
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affairs in the future such that the original state of affairs, namely the visit to the dentist 
tomorrow culminating in my experiencing a world of pain, ceases to be a plausible one which 
lies in my future, that is, if I cancel my appointment with my dentist right now and thus have 
watching a movie tomorrow as a feasible future for me instead. As it is rational to take steps 
to reduce present discomforts, it is thus rationally justified for me to take steps to remove my 
future pains in the dentist chair. And as being moved to take steps to remove my future pains 
is regarded as being concerned towards such future pains, I can be said to harbor a concern 
towards my future pains. Additionally, since my future pains cause worries and anxieties of a 
different sort than others’ future pains in me, so I can be said to have a rationally justified 
special concern towards my future pains.  
 
   Am I, however, justified in the possession of worries and anxieties of a special sort for my 
future selves, and no other future selves, in the first place? This is what adherents to the non-
reductionist accounts of personal survival can assert, and the defenders of the reductionist 
accounts of personal survival must deny. This is because any concern that is operative on the 
reductionist account must be a derivative one, grounded in the principle of cause and effect, 
or that which guarantees the temporal aspect of personal survival. Recall that the reductionists 
take what is important in personal persistence to be the connections between, for example, 
intentions and the actions taken at a later time to realize the intentions, and where these 
connections must be appropriately causal in nature. What counts as appropriate, however, is a 
matter of degree, on the psychological continuity thesis for example. Consider the following 
case: 
“A team of scientists develop a procedure whereby, given about a month’s 
worth of interviews and tests, the use of a huge computer, a few selected 
particles of tissue, and a little time, they can produce a human being as like 
any given human as desired. I am a member of the team, have complete (and 
justified) confidence in the process and the discretion of my colleagues, and I 
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have an incurable disease. It is proposed that I be interviewed, tested, and 
painlessly disposed of; that a duplicate be created, in secret, and simply take 
over my life. Everyone, except my colleagues, will think he is me (the 
duplicate himself will not know; he is made unlike I would be, only in not 
remembering the planning of this project), and my colleagues, who have all 
studied and been convinced by this article, will treat him as me, feeling that 
the fact that he is not is, in this case, quite unimportant.”16 
Parfitian psychological continuity theorists will take the above scenario to describe a case of 
me surviving as a person having most of my beliefs, desires, intentions, memories, and so on. 
This is because this person is psychologically continuous with my present self to a very high 
degree, and will live out my life in accordance to how I will wish it to be lived in my current 
state of mind. And so if this person is to visit the dentist on my behalf the next day, I should 
now have a special concern for his future pains in the dentist’s office as well, not because of 
how the pains feel, but because of how the pains will impair my duplicate’s ability to carry on 
with the actions stemming from my intentions, acting on my current believes and desires, and 
so on. Concern on this framework will be derivative; I am concerned for my well-being only 
because an impoverished state of well-being will mean I am less able to carry out what I set 
out to do.  
 
   That we have a derivative form of concern is fair enough, but is that all there is to the idea 
of a special concern towards one’s future pains? Returning to the example above, even if I do 
have a derivative special concern towards my duplicate’s future visit to the dentist, it seems 
that I also do harbour an additional set of concerns: those towards my suffering from my 
incurable disease before I am painlessly disposed of by my colleagues. Even though I 
understand well enough that my realistic projects and plans will be capably brought to fruition 
by my duplicate, and that my unrealistic ones will still survive in the imagination of my 
                                                          
16
 Perry, J., “The Importance of Being Identical”, from The Identity of Persons, ed. Rorty, A. 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 83.  
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similarly optimistic duplicate, I will still be concerned for the fact that my incurable disease 
still afflicts me, and will continue to do so until this configuration of flesh and blood is 
disposed of. In fact, this additional set of concerns seems to be in line with the phenomenal 
continuity thesis which posits that I shall not survive as the duplicate but as my diseased self, 
owing to my being phenomenally continuous with the latter and not the former. This means 
that, in situations such as this, if we take concern to be justified only if it is derived from our 
attitudes towards future plans and projects, we will then end up having justified special 
concerns for future selves other than my own future selves. This will also mean that, if we are 
to agree that only the derivative form of concern is justified, some of the worries and anxieties 
that we have for our future selves, by the phenomenal continuity theorists’ construal, will turn 
out to be unjustified.  
 
   It is with the above issue in place that Parfit has made his assertion about not being as 
concerned for his future self upon believing in a reductionist account of personal survival. As 
concerns are only derivative, and as such a rendering of ‘concern’ can get us to a justified 
special concern towards our future pains, we need only direct our emotions towards the future 
as it affects our projects and plans, and cease to have any worries and anxieties about 
ourselves. However, the occurrences of worries and anxieties directed towards our own future 
selves such as those directed towards the diseased self in the example above can still be 
accounted for by the reductionists, in the sense that reductionists can explain why it is that we 
have such worries and anxieties, albeit their being ultimately unjustifiably had: in normal 
everyday life, problems of personal persistence do not crop up, because bodily, psychological 
and phenomenal continuities do not ordinarily come apart, and so we do not usually take 
concerns to be merely derivative. We are emotionally attached to our flesh and blood and 
current experiences only because under normal circumstances, we are not faced with cases 
which show us what is really important to personal survival. Once we have seen what is really 
important, by the light of such problem cases, however, we should see that such worries and 
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anxieties can only be accounted for by looking at how they are generated, and not justifiably 
had when we see that they cannot have a rational basis against the framework that all 
concerns can only be derivative.  
 
   As shown above, there are two ways whereby we can make sense of the notion of a special 
concern towards our future selves. The difference between the two is that the account which 
the non-reductionists concerning personal survival favour is one which takes all instances of 
having a special concern towards one’s own future selves to be justified, and which takes 
none of the instances of having concern towards other future selves to be of a special sort; 
while the account which is compatible with reductionism concerning personal survival is one 
which takes only certain instances of having a special concern towards one’s own future 
selves to be justified, and which takes some instances of having a special concern towards 
other future selves to be equally justified as well. In the following sections, I shall outline an 
argument which shows that the first, non-reductive account is incoherent. This is not such a 
bad state of affairs, however, given that we can still appeal to the account of the justified 
possession of special concern for our future selves by understanding such concerns to be 
derivative, and that an explanatory account can still be given as to why it is that we possess 
unjustified, non-derivative concerns for our future selves, as formulated along the lines of 
what has gone on in the preceding paragraph. Derivative concerns, although not 
encompassing all of our worries and anxieties directed towards our future, nevertheless range 
over most of such worries and anxieties, with the only exceptions being those which will only 
be at issue under special circumstances, such as those outlined in philosophical puzzles such 
as the one presented by Perry. As most, if not all, of these puzzles will not occur in real life, 
the brand of justified special concern towards one’s future selves as favoured by the 
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What has the idea of special concern got to do with the philosophy of time and change? 
Seeing as special concern is only directed towards the future, be it to ourselves directly or 
derivatively via our projects and plans for the future, if an investigation as to how time, and in 
particular, the future, is to be construed can shed light on how it is that we should think about 
our future selves, this may have a bearing on the issue of just how it is that we are to deal with 
the idea of a special concern we have towards our future pains.  
 
   My strategy for this section is simple: I shall present a few dichotomies as to how time has 
been suggested to be thought about. With these dichotomies in hand, I can then go on to plug 
these competing notions into the next section to see what notions of future selves we end up 
with. The dichotomies to be outlined will be the following: as regards the metaphysics of 
change, that between endurantism and perdurantism; and as regards the metaphysics of time, 
that between presentism and eternalism, and theories which straddle these two positions.  I 
will also then go on and discuss views known as ‘three-dimensionalism’, ‘four-
dimensionalism’ and what I call the ‘Replacement Theory’, and how we should recast 
discussions concerning change and persistence in their terms instead.  
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I: Endurantism and Perdurantism. 
 
The metaphysics of change explores how best to make sense of the phenomena of change and 
persistence. ‘Change’, on one hand, refers to the holding of contrary properties by a single 
object over time. Hence, some X, if it changes from time t1 to time t2, has some property A 
which it holds at t1 and the property not-A which it holds at time t2. If X possesses any 
property other than A at a later stage of time than at the current stage when it possesses 
property A, then it is deemed to have undergone change. For example, the changing of the 
colour of a fallen leaf from autumn to winter is characterized as the leaf possessing the 
property of being green at autumn and being not-green at winter (for it has become brown). 
‘Persistence’, on the other hand, refers to the holding of the same set of properties by a single 
object over time. Hence, some X, if it persists from time t1 to time t2, will have the same set 
of properties across that period of time. For example, a green leaf has persisted across a 
period of two days in spring if it has the same colour, shape, size, molecular configuration, 
etc., over this period of two days.  
 
   It has to be noted that the commonsense notion of the phenomenon of change has to include 
that of persistence as well, because there must always be a persisting thing underlying 
changes being made to it. Something changes only if that same thing possesses different 
properties at different times. Two distinct objects having different properties at different times 
do not characterize change, for nothing has been described as having changed through the 
period of time. This commonsense notion of change and persistence, however, has been 
challenged, as we shall see later in the third part of this section when we consider three- and 
four-dimensionalism.  
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   Endurantism and perdurantism are metaphysical positions divided on the issue as to how 
persistence, and therefore change as well, are to be understood. The disagreement between 
defenders of these two positions is illustrated thus:  
“Let us say that something persists iff, somehow or other, it exists at various 
times; this is the neutral word. Something perdures iff it persists by having 
different temporal parts, or stages, at different times, though no part of it is 
wholly present at more than one time; whereas it endures iff it persists by 
being wholly present at more than one time.”1 
According to endurantism then, the leaf in the above example on persistence at the start of the 
two days is the same leaf at the end of the two days by virtue of it being ‘wholly present’ 
across the time period. What does the ‘wholly present’ mean, however? It means that the leaf 
is numerically the same one in all its ontological categories: the same hunk of matter is being 
regarded when we consider the leaf at the start of the two days and at the end of the two days. 
When we consider change, the leaf at autumn in the above example on change is the same leaf 
at winter by virtue of it being wholly present but for the parts necessary for effecting the 
colour change across the time period from autumn to winter. The leaf is numerically the same 
one in all its ontological categories sans those which account for the colour change across the 
time period: the same hunk of matter, with its colour having changed, is being regarded when 
we consider the leaf at autumn and the leaf at winter.  
 
   According to perdurantism, on the other hand, the leaf in the above example on persistence 
at the start of the two days is the same leaf at the end of the two days by virtue of it having 
different ‘temporal parts’ with the same set of properties across the time period. What is a 
‘temporal part’ of an object, however? These are parts a physical object is deemed to have by 
construing objects to be extended in four dimensions: the three spatial ones, and the temporal 
one. Taking into account the temporal extents of objects will mean parts of the objects occupy 
                                                          
1
 Lewis, D., On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), p. 202.  
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certain times while other parts occupy other times, and that means that objects are never 
wholly present at any one point of time of their existence, unless they exist only in an instant. 
Plugging this account into the persisting leaf example, the leaf has a temporal part with a 
certain set of properties at the start of the two days, and other temporal parts between the start 
of the two days and the end of the two days, with the same set of properties. The leaf itself, 
strictly speaking, does not occupy any particular point of time of the leaf’s existence – it is too 
big to fit into a particular point of time, as its temporal extent causes parts of it to ‘jut out’ of 
the particular spacetime frame at that instant – but occupies the whole period of time 
characterizing its existence. Whenever particular points of time are considered, it is objects’ 
temporal parts, and not objects themselves, which are under appraisal, because of this 
construal of what physical objects really are. When we consider change, on the other hand, in 
the leaf at autumn example, what accounts for the change in the leaf’s colour is that the leaf 
has a temporal part at autumn which is green, and a temporal part at winter which is brown 
(as well as a whole slew of other temporal parts in between which have various other shades 
of green and brown).  
 
   The debate between endurantism, and perdurantism, as is clear from the above examples, is 
over the nature of physical objects and how they relate to time. Where endurantism posits that 
physical objects are essentially three-dimensional and which persist and change through the 
temporal dimension, perdurantism posits that physical objects really are four-dimensional 
hunks of matter with their temporal extents belonging to them essentially as well, on top of 
their three spatial extents. This means that metaphysically speaking, temporal parts of objects 
constitute another ontological category for physical objects. On the endurantist point of view, 
however, temporal parts of objects do not exist, except metaphorically when we want to 
describe the phenomena of persistence and change. What exist, on this latter view, are just 
three-dimensional physical objects in and through time. This debate, however, is somewhat 
more complicated when we discuss it in the language of dimensions, as I have done in the 
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above. I shall return to this issue when we consider three-dimensionalism and four-
dimensionalism again in the third part of this section. It is perhaps instructive now, however, 
to characterize the difference between these two positions as follows:  
“I propose that a physical object is not an enduring spatial hunk of matter, 
but is, rather, a spatiotemporal hunk of matter. Instead of thinking of matter 
as filling up regions of space, we should think of matter as filling up regions 
of spacetime. A physical object is the material content of a region of 
spacetime. Just as such an object has spatial extent, it also has temporal 
extent – it extends along four dimensions, not just three.”2 
                                                          
2
 Heller, M., “Temporal Parts of Four Dimensional Objects”, from Philosophical Studies, 46 (1984), p. 
325. 
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II: Presentism and Eternalism. 
 
The names ‘presentism’ and ‘eternalism’ are given to opposing viewpoints in debates over the 
philosophy of time, but these names are not always used to mean the same positions across 
contexts and discussions. ‘Presentism’, in particular, has been used to refer to positions with a 
variance of ontological commitments. My concern in this section is to outline differing views 
as to what exists, and I will therefore characterize the difference between presentism and 
eternalism in what is to follow, with this concern in mind.  
 
   Presentism, I take it, is the doctrine which states that all that exists does so in the present 
moment. Past and future objects and states of affairs do not exist. This means that, for a 
presentist, or someone who endorses presentism, the list of things which exist is pretty short: 
dinosaurs and the next laptop computer model do not exist, except as ideas in the heads of 
people who are remembering them or thinking them up, respectively. Objects and events and 
states of affairs on the other side of the world at the present moment, however, do exist. What 
do presentists make of talk involving past and future objects and states of affairs, however?  
 
   The most straightforward answer consistent with presentism is that all of them culminate in 
falsehoods: when I make a claim about the past or the future, they are false claims, because 
the past and the future do not exist. This response, however, is not too attractive and does not 
have many supporters, for most people will want to say that they are making truth claims with 
statements such as “It rained this morning”. A more popular response to the question 
concerning talk about the past and the future is that such talk is capable of truth and falsity 
because of the existence of truthmakers, or states of affairs which make true or false our truth 
claims. The problem with this response, however, is how we are to locate truthmakers in time. 
Do truthmakers for statements such as “It rained this morning” exist right now or in the past? 
If they exist in the past, then by the presentist’s construal, they do not exist at all. On the other 
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hand, it seems that the only way for them to exist in the present is if we take on board a 
certain degree of verificationist commitment – for example the statement “It rained this 
morning” is true because the roads are wet now – a commitment which not many are 
comfortable with taking up. This is because, given the sparse presentist ontology, this 
commitment will turn out to be very significant: in the raining example above, it turns out that 
the statement “It rained this morning” can turn out true only because the roads are wet now.  
 
   Another way in which presentists can square their ontology with talk regarding the past and 
the future will be to postulate non-existing objects, events and states of affairs. One way in 
which this has been done is to adopt a Meinongian ontology which includes subsisting, but 
non-existing, objects. According to this sort of view, everything is an object, be it if it is 
thinkable, unthinkable, located in the past, situated in the present, or lodged in the future, in 
the sense that everything has subsistence, but only some objects have existence, namely, those 
objects which are situated in the present, whether thinkable or not. Hence, golden mountains, 
the squaring of the circle, dinosaurs, the next laptop computer model, an undiscovered coal 
mine on the other side of the world right now; are all objects and events and states of affairs 
which have subsistence. What is relevant about this ontology are the following two theses:  
M1: There are objects, events and states of affairs which do not exist.  
M2: Every object, event and state of affairs which does not exist is yet 
constituted in some way or other and so is capable of being made the 
subject of true or false predication.  
This means that presentists who accept this sort of ontology can meaningfully speak of 
objects, events and states of affairs which do not exist, including past and future objects, 
events and states of affairs, by virtue of their being as constituted by their subsistence, even 
though all objects, events and states of affairs that exist are located in the present.3 
                                                          
3
 This is merely a sketch of some of the consequences of taking up a Meinongian stance in defending 
presentism, and is not Meinong’s own view, at least not his own view with regards to time. For more 
on Meinong’s theory of objects see Chisholm, R., Brentano and Meinong Studies (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 
1982), pp. 37-68. 
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   A problem with this line of defense is that there seems no principled way for a Meinongian 
presentist to distinguish objects, events and states of affairs in the past and future, from 
objects, events and states of affairs which are merely possible. What is possible in the past 
and future seems ontologically indistinguishable from what is actual in the past and future – 
unlike the distinction that can be made between what is thinkable and unthinkable – if all that 
exist do so in the present.  The postulation that there just is a difference between what is 
actually past and future and what is merely possibly past and future seems like an ad hoc 
move to have the presentist cake and eat it. And if the distinction between what is possible 
and what is actual cannot be made when we regard past and future events, then it is unclear as 
to how a Meinongian ontology will help the presentist in making sense of claims involving 
objects, event and states of affairs which are not present: the claim “Some dinosaurs are 
carnivorous” and the claim “Some unicorns are carnivorous” have, it seems, the same 
ontological basis in that they both are truth-apt and have truth values by recourse to their 
similarly subsisting referents. The only way for the former claim to have a more substantial 
ontological basis will be perhaps to point out that dinosaurs seem to have more of a 
metaphysical relevance to the present because of the existence of dinosaur fossils and the 
continued non-existence of the proof of unicorns’ existence, but this means we are back once 
again to a verificationist support of the presentist position, which we have already found 
suspect. The existence of dinosaur fossils just points to what it is: that bones of certain sizes 
and shapes exist, but not that dinosaurs therefore existed. The existence of dinosaur fossils 
provides evidential support for the past existence of dinosaurs, but this evidence helps us in 
deducing the existence of dinosaurs only if we accept that there is a reality to the past in a 
more full-blooded sense than the presentists are wont to admit. If it turns out that the 
presentists cannot, on this account, maintain a principled distinction between actual and 
possible past and future objects, events and states of affairs, however, then it seems that to 
turn to a Meinongian ontology for support in making sense of the past and future will not 
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yield a satisfying result, unless we are to admit the implausible consequence that there is 
really no such principled distinction.  
 
   Yet another way in which presentists have tackled the above problem is to deny the 
truthmaker theory, and to take the truth or falsity of statements about the past and the future to 
be a primitive property of propositions about the past and the future.4 This means that truth is 
not a property tagged onto existing objects, and so sentences about the past and the future can 
still be true even if past and future objects do not exist. It is a fact, according to this variant of 
presentism, that dinosaurs existed in the past because it is a fact which presently holds in the 
world that dinosaurs existed. It is also a fact about the world at present that the next laptop 
computer model will exist. The world, according to Bigelow, is “a changing ground of eternal 
truths.”5 This is because the actual world is understood as the set of all true propositions. 
Some propositions are eternally true, such as the statement “There (tenselessly) are dinosaurs 
between the late Triassic period and the Cretaceous period”, because they are true at any and 
all times. The set of true propositions which is the actual world, however, contains more than 
just these propositions, because they contain propositions such as “Dinosaurs existed in the 
past” as well, which are not true at all times. These changing latter statements, however, 
outline just the change in the grounds for the eternal truths expressed in the tenseless 
propositions, which do not change. What this means is that this variant of presentism allows 
true and false statements about the past and the future but still keep to their presentist 
ontology of containing only existing objects, because propositions about things which are in 
the past and future and thus which do not exist can nevertheless turn out true or false because 
past and future facts are ‘world properties’, properties which are instantiated even in the 
present. “Dinosaurs existed in the past”, on this account of presentism, expresses a truth 
because the fact that the world is burdened with a certain sort of past is a presently held fact. 
This suggestion, however, is at the cost of giving up the truthmaker theory and, to some 
                                                          
4
 See Bigelow, J., “Presentism and Properties”, from Noûs, 30, Supplement: Philosophical 
Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, 1996 (1996), pp. 35-52 for an example of such a view. 
5
 Ibid. p. 48. 
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writers, even the correspondence theory of truth, a cost which is considerable to some. I shall, 
however, not go into a discussion on the merits and demerits of advocating or abandoning the 
truthmaker theory and/or the correspondence theory of truth, as the purpose of this exposition 
of this variant of presentism is just to present some examples of presentist responses to 
statements about the past and the future, together with their merits and demerits.6  
 
   Eternalism, on the other hand, I take it, is the doctrine that past, present and future objects, 
events and states of affairs are all equally real. So according to the eternalists, the list of 
things which exist will be much more extensive than that of the presentists: dinosaurs and the 
next laptop computer model exist in the same sense that objects, events and states of affairs 
on the other side of the world do. More often than not, eternalists appeal to a close analogy 
between time and space: positions in time are not very different from positions in space, in 
that since being here in space does not preclude the reality of everywhere else, so being in the 
present time does not preclude the reality of every other point in time. There is, therefore, for 
the eternalists, no ontological difference between objects, events and states of affairs at 
different times. The only differences between them are positional and geographical, and the 
notions of past, present and future are nothing more than temporal analogues to the spatial 
indexicals ‘hereness’ and ‘thereness’. Insofar as my being here does not confer a special 
ontological status upon me as opposed to someone else’s being there, so too does my being 
now not mean anything ontologically significant as opposed to my being then.  
 
   It is not difficult to see right away how eternalism deals with the problems plaguing 
presentism. Past and future objects, events and states of affairs exist inasmuch as present 
objects, events and states of affairs do, and so can act as parts of the truthmakers to statements 
involving past and future objects, events and states of affairs. The statement, “It rained this 
                                                          
6
 For more on the truthmaker theory, see Armstrong, D. M., A World of States of Affairs (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), as well as his Truth and Truthmakers (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). For a collection of papers on the debates surrounding the truthmaker theory 
and correspondence theories of truth, see Beebe, H. and Dodd, J., eds., Truthmakers: The 
Contemporary Debate (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005). 
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morning” is made true or false by the state of this morning’s weather, which exists regardless 
of the temporal location of the speaker. The question that arises for eternalism at this point, 
however, is the same one which afflicts presentism: when do the truthmakers for statements 
involving the past and the future exist? Taking the above raining example, it seems that to say 
that the truthmaker for the statement “It rained this morning” – which is, presumably, the 
body of rainwater which fell out of the sky this morning – exists regardless of the temporal 
location of the speaker is to say that it exists even as the speaker is making the claim. Yet how 
can this morning’s rain exist now?  
 
   One way in which an eternalist can respond to this problem is to distinguish between two 
senses of presence. On the one hand, there is the ontological sense which answers to matters 
concerning existence. Some object, event or state of affairs is present if it exists. On the other 
hand, there is the sense operative behind the use of indexical terms such as ‘now’ and ‘the 
present’, which, to the eternalists, does not gesture towards anything ontologically significant, 
but which only belies a certain sort of mental pointing analogous to the use of spatial 
indexical terms such as ‘here’. Whether or not something exists, according to eternalism, does 
not depend on what time it is, because times just indicate the locations of existent objects, 
events and states of affairs. Terms such as ‘now’ and ‘the present’ do not indicate anything of 
ontological significance, and are merely linguistic devices which can be treated, for example, 
as token reflexive operators.7 Hence, even though this morning’s rain does not have 
‘presence’ in the indexical sense such that we in the present cannot experience it, it 
nevertheless has ‘presence’ in the ontological sense such that it exists and renders the 
statement “It rained this morning” true.  
 
   One nagging question and an accompanying criticism await the eternalist: what do we make 
of the intuition that presence, in the temporal sense (now), differs significantly from presence, 
                                                          
7
 See Mellor, D. H., Real Time (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 29-46 for such a 
treatment of tensed terminology such as ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’.  
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in the spatial sense (here)? Also, the ontological commitment for the eternalist seems too 
much to swallow when the only advantage she has over the presentist is a certain way of 
making sense of talk concerning the past and the future. A short reply to the question will be 
that the mentioned intuition is just mistaken, and that we have no reason to think that what it 
suggests is true. The world’s events are unfolded before our eyes from one moment of time to 
another, but just as places in the world are revealed to us one in one point in space to another, 
we should not think indexicality of any sort reveals any significant insight to our ontology. 
We have as much of a reason to reject presentism as solipsism, and the reasons are similar: 
where the latter posits an unjustified bias towards the self, the former posits an unjustified 
bias towards the temporal present. As for the criticism that eternalism posits the existence of 
just too many objects, events and states of affairs, the eternalist will probably respond that it 
is a necessary consequence that we should accept because making sense of talk concerning 
the past and future seems more valuable than a hopeless attempt at keeping our posited 
ontology small.  
 
   Presentism and eternalism, however, do not exhaust the possibilities of conceptualizing 
metaphysical time. Keeping in mind the problems facing both presentism and eternalism, 
there have been attempts to combine both views and adopt a hybrid ‘possibilist’ position. 
Possibilism agrees with eternalism in that not only the present exists, but disagrees with 
eternalism in that there are significant disanalogies between time and space for us to posit that 
the past and future exist just as much as the present does. The resulting picture is that of a 
‘dynamic universe’: the past and the present are real, but the future is not, or at least not yet. 
This means that, where statements concerning the past and the present have definite truth 
values, there is indeterminacy with regards to future objects, events and states of affairs, and 
therefore statements involving such future entities have an indeterminate truth value. The 
statements “It rained this morning” and “It is raining now” are either true or false, because of 
existing past and present objects, events and states of affairs, but the statement “It will rain 
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tomorrow” is neither true nor false at the time of the utterance, because future objects, events 
and states of affairs do not exist yet. There are two ways in which such a view has been 
presented: the Growing Universe Theory, and the Diminishing Universe Theory. Both views 
are examples of what is known as the passage view of time, in that time is deemed to pass 
with the moving present being of ontological significance by being the locus of the 
phenomenon of ‘becoming’, or objects, events and states of affairs coming into existence or 
becoming actual. We shall now take a brief look at each of these possibilist views in turn.  
 
   The Growing Universe Theory suggests that the ontological furniture of the universe 
increases numerically over time. As more of the future becomes present with each passing 
moment of time, more objects, events and states of affairs come into being, and this adds to 
the stock of already existing objects, events and states of affairs in the past and the present.8 
The Diminishing Universe Theory, on the other hand, suggests that the ontological furniture 
of the universe decreases numerically over time. This view combines a modal realist view 
with the possibilist contention that the present has an ontological significance over the past 
and the future. There are multiple possible future objects, events and states of affairs, and 
these are as much part of the ontological furniture of the world as the already actual (meaning 
the past and present) objects, events and states of affairs. As time passes, however, and as 
more objects, events and states of affairs become actual, the other contending possible 
scenarios of the future drop out of the ontology of the universe, and the world therefore 
becomes numerically smaller.9 Where the Growing Universe Theory can be illustrated as a 
growing block of entities in the world over time, the Diminishing Universe Theory can be 
illustrated as a branching universe with more and more of the branches being eliminated over 
time.  
    
                                                          
8
 One advocate of such a view is C.D. Broad. See his Scientific Thought (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1983), pp. 53-84 for a more detailed account.  
9
 One advocate of such a view is S. McCall. See his A Model of the Universe (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 1-19 for a more detailed account.  
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   There is, in addition, another version of the passage view of time, and this is commonly 
described as the ‘Spotlight View’ of temporal presence. On this view, what exists in all of 
time is laid out as per the eternalist view: past and future objects, events and states of affairs 
exist to make statements about them true. The present, while being equally existent as well, 
nevertheless is still seen to be the locus of becoming, in that present objects, events and states 
of affairs are posited to be ontologically more significant than past and future ones. Objects, 
events and states of affairs are laid out on the eternalist timeline, and the present moves over 
these objects, events and states of affairs with its passage, much like a spotlight from a patrol 
helicopter moving across a stretch of coastal waters at night. Thus, objects, events and states 
of affairs can be said to don and shed their temporal properties of pastness, presence and 
futurity as time passes. Objects, events and states of affairs first possess the property of being 
in the distant future, discard this property and at the same time acquire the properties of being 
in the nearer and nearer future instead, discard these and momentarily acquire the property of 
being present, then discard this and acquire the property of being in the near past, and finally 
discard this and acquire the properties of being in the more and more distant past.  
 
   The Spotlight View is an objectionable view of time because it runs into the problem 
described by Donald Williams, commonly known as the ‘rate of passage’ problem.10 Any part 
of time cannot be taken to be literally moving, like how the present, taken to be a particular 
moment in time which is the locus of becoming, is construed to be moving along the eternalist 
timeline as per the Spotlight View described above. This literal movement is contrasted with 
metaphorical use of the term ‘motion’, illustrated below: 
“’Does this road go anywhere?’ asks the city tourist. ‘No, it stays right along 
here,’ replies the countryman. Time ‘flows’ only in the sense in which a line 
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 See Williams, D. C., “The Myth of Passage”, from The Journal of Philosophy, 48(15) (1951), pp. 
457-472 for his discussion of the issue.  
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flows or a landscape ‘recedes into the west.’ That is, it is an ordered 
extension.”11 
Why is it, however, that time itself, or any of its parts, cannot move in the literal sense? This 
is because motion in the literal sense, or true motion, already involves the parameter of time. 
For example, true spatial motion, as we understand it, occurs when something changes its 
spatial position over a certain period of time. Therefore, when something undergoes true 
motion, it is always possible to ask the question “What is the rate of its change?” and expect 
that a coherent answer can be possibly given. An accurate answer may not always be known, 
of course, but this is an epistemological problem which has nothing to do with the fact that a 
coherent answer can, in principle, be given if we have the relevant information required. The 
problem with the idea that the present undergoes true motion is that there does not seem to be 
a coherent answer to the question “What is the rate of change in the motion of the present?” 
 
   Why is it that the rate of change in time’s passage cannot be coherently expressed? Consider 
what sort of an answer is available when we consider the rate of change of objects in space. 
The rate of change of, for example, a car travelling from Town A to Town B can be given as 
the rate of change in its position over a certain period of time. If the distance between the two 
towns is 200 miles, and if the time taken for the car to travel that distance is 2 hours, then the 
rate of change of the car’s motion is 100 miles per hour. In determining the rate of change of 
any object undergoing true motion, we follow the same principle: any object in true motion 
has its rate of change defined as its change in that medium per unit of time. In the case of the 
suggested passage of time as per the Spotlight View, however, this means that the rate of 
change of the present’s passage is to be its change in time per unit of time: the rate of change 
of the present will be one second per second. This will mean one of two things: either (1) the 
rate of change of temporal passage expresses a tautology and time does not therefore move in 
the literal sense, or (2) the rate of change of temporal passage expresses a vicious infinite 
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series of meta-times, and as with all vicious infinite series, this puts considerable pressure on 
the view that time moves literally.   
 
   The rate of change of temporal passage expresses a tautology if we understand temporal 
passage as a metaphor describing time’s ordered extension. There is just one temporal series, 
and that is all. “One second per one second” will mean one second on the temporal series 
‘passes’ with each second on the same series. That time moves at a rate of one second per 
second is just another way of saying time can be seen to be extended in ordered intervals of 
one second each. Inasmuch as a road by itself does not literally move, but can still be 
figuratively described as ‘receding into the west’ at a rate of one mile per mile, so too is time 
unable to move literally, but can still be described in words which typically convey a sense of 
movement, as a figure of speech.  
 
   If, however, we do not want the rate of “One second per second” to express a tautology, 
then we will be suggesting that there is more than one temporal series. When understood in 
this sense, the rate of temporal passage, strictly speaking, will be “One second on temporal 
series X per second on temporal series Y”. This is in line with our thinking about other rates, 
such as the rate of motion of the travelling car in the example above. This interpretation is 
problematic, however, because if we take literal passage to be a feature of temporal series, 
then in order for temporal series X to be construed as literally moving over another temporal 
series, then that second temporal series, namely temporal series Y, will have to move as well, 
over yet another temporal series. This will mean yet another temporal series will be needed, 
and so on ad infinitum. Because we do not want to think of time to comprise an infinite 
number of temporal series, this option is not very attractive.  
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   Ned Markosian, among others, has challenged the rate of passage argument outlined above, 
in trying to validate views of time which take time to move literally.12 He has two suggestions 
in getting us out of the above problem: (1) Just as we can give the rate of change of, for 
example, a car’s displacement in space by comparing its change in spatial position to its 
change in temporal position, so too can we give the rate of change of temporal passage by 
comparing its change to other changes such as a car’s displacement in space; and (2) The rate 
of temporal passage cannot be measured because  
“[…] the pure passage of time has a unique status among changes – it is the 
one to which other, normal changes are to be compared. It is the paradigm, 
and, as such, it alone among changes cannot be measured.”13 
These suggestions, however, are problematic and cannot serve to remove the rate of passage 
objection to the view that time literally moves. The problem is that these suggestions end us 
up with distorted interpretations of literal movement and rates. Let us now look at the 
problem inherent in each suggestion in turn. 
 
   Markosian’s first suggestion is problematic because we typically understand rates involving 
literal movement to be of changes in time. To understand the rate of temporal passage by 
comparing the movement of the present to other changes, such as by understanding time to 
flow at a rate of one hour per 100 miles travelled as given in the example of the moving car 
above, is to already smuggle in the notion that time moves literally. When we say that the car 
moves at a rate of 100 miles per hour, we are saying that the car is moving in space, which 
does not move by itself, just as we are saying that the car is moving in time, which does not 
move by itself as well. To say that time literally moves together with the car in the 100-mile 
distance is to say that another higher order temporal series is involved, which brings us back 
to the problem of the vicious infinite series.  
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 See Markosian, N., “How Fast Does Time Pass?”, from Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, 53(4) (1993), pp. 829-844.  
13
 Ibid. p. 843. 
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   Markosian’s second suggestion, that the question concerning the rate of temporal passage 
cannot be coherently answered, because it is the paradigm of change, avoids our having to 
posit a vicious infinite series of higher-order temporal series, at the cost of mystifying the idea 
of temporal passage. We are to take the literal movement of time as a brute fact, a movement 
which has a rate which is in principle unmeasurable. This seems ad hoc, because we have 
other views of time which both preserves our thinking that rates of literally moving things 
measure changes against a temporal series, and also does not posit an infinite number of 
temporal series, such as Williams’s view which takes time to be an ordered extension. To 
posit that time has such a unique property as a necessarily unmeasurable rate, is to assert that 
the rate of passage argument is invalid without good reason, when the rate of passage 
argument is in line with how we typically understand literal movement and rates of change.  
 
   Let us now take stock and see how the metaphysics of time affects the debate between 
endurantism and perdurantism. Presentism, as I have presented it, rejects both the ideas of 
endurantism and perdurantism, because objects, events and states of affairs, on the presentist 
construal, do not persist, due to the reality of only one moment of time (the situation for 
Meinongian and Bigelow’s version of presentism is different, but these views will be 
discussed in conjunction with the metaphysics of change in the next section). Eternalism and 
possibilism, on the other hand, can be made compatible with both endurantism and 
perdurantism at this point, because these two theories of time posit the reality of more than 
one moment of time and hence are compatible with the view that objects, events and states of 
affairs do persist. What is most important in this section, for my purposes, is how not to think 
about persistence, and that is in the way as described by the Spotlight View or in any other 
way which falls prey to the rate of passage objection. Objects, events and states of affairs, 
therefore, cannot persist by donning and shedding properties of pastness, presence and 
futurity over time.  
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III: Three-Dimensionalism and Four-Dimensionalism. 
 
As seen in the preceding sub-sections, the phenomena of change and persistence have been 
explained via perdurantist and endurantist means, and change and persistence are phenomena 
which are inexorably tied to the metaphysics of time. Perdurantism and endurantism, if any or 
either is or are to be valid ways of describing the phenomena of change and persistence, will 
therefore have to be compatible with valid ways of thinking about time. It is to this end that I 
will now discuss the debate between three- and four-dimensionalism.  
 
   Three-dimensionalism is the theory that objects are just extended in the three spatial 
dimensions. The temporal dimension, construed in this way, has no essential bearing on 
objects themselves, but is the dimension in which objects have their properties affected. One 
way in which this theory has been expounded is by way of endurantism: objects are wholly 
present throughout every moment of their existence.  
 
   An objection against endurantism arises at this point. How are we to make sense of what it 
means for objects to be ‘wholly present’ throughout every moment of their existence? What 
does it mean, to go back to the changing leaf example in the earlier sub-section, for the leaf at 
autumn to be ‘wholly present’ throughout every moment from autumn to winter? Surely it 
cannot mean that the leaf at autumn is very literally the leaf at winter in all respects, for at 
least the colour of the leaf at autumn is different from the colour of the leaf at winter. To 
claim that the leaf at autumn is the very same leaf as the leaf in winter, in this strict sense, is 
to violate the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, which states that:  
For any x and y, if x is identical to y, then whatever features, properties or 
aspects that x has or relations x stands in, y also has and stands in. 
This above principle follows directly from the Law of Identity, which states that: 
Anything is the same as itself. 
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This above law, in turn, is largely taken to be indisputable, as Aristotle writes:  
“It is pointless to ask why anything is itself. For a fact, such as that it is true 
that, let us say, a lunar eclipse is, must be clear at the start. But the fact that 
anything is itself is the one and only reason that can be given in answer to all 
such questions as why a man is a man or a musician is a musician; unless one 
were to add that this is so because everything is inseparable from itself and 
that just this is what is meant by ‘being one’. But this fact is common to 
everything and is a short-cut explanation.”14 
This means that, however the leaf at autumn and the leaf at winter are related to each other, it 
cannot be by way of identity, in the sense that is conveyed by the Law of Identity and the 
Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Debates over the metaphysics of change 
typically take this law and principle to be the starting point of the problem of characterizing 
the phenomenon of change, and the challenge is to explain how the leaf at autumn can still be 
said to be the ‘same’ as the leaf at winter.  
 
   Four-dimensional perdurantism has a ready explanation. The sameness relation, the 
perdurantist takes it, is mereological in nature: the leaf at autumn is said to be the same as the 
leaf at winter because they are parts of the same whole which is the four-dimensional leaf 
which has a temporal extent covering both autumn and winter. Objects on this construal are 
four-dimensional hunks of spacetime, and can be seen to be composed of temporal parts 
which exhibit certain properties at certain times. The leaf at autumn is a distinct temporal part 
from the leaf at winter, as they occur at different times of the leaf’s existence, and have 
different properties, including that of colour, but they are the same leaf in that they are both 
temporal parts of the whole four-dimensional leaf. This sameness relation can be reflected by 
a spatial analogy: a road which runs through two towns, P and Q, can be said to have a part at 
P and a part at Q. The part at P, however, is not identical to the part at Q – they are distinct 
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 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book Zeta, Part 17, trans. Hope, R. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1952), p. 166. 
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parts – but both parts can be said to be of the same road in that they, with other parts, make up 
the mereological whole that is the entire stretch of the road. Change, therefore, according to 
perdurantism, is nothing more than different temporal parts of a single object possessing 
different properties. That the leaf possesses contrary properties at different times is as much a 
contradictory state of affairs than that the road at P can be narrow while the road at Q can be 
broad expresses a contradiction: the contrary properties are possessed by distinct parts of a 
mereological whole, and not by a single object.  
 
   This is not to say that those in the three-dimensionalism camp are completely without the 
wherewithal to account for the phenomenon of change without violating the Principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals and the Law of Identity, however. Notably, there is the view that 
time exists not as another dimension to physical reality, but as part of an index to objects 
which characterizes their possession of properties. There are two variations of this view: (1) 
objects bear the primitive relation of possession to time-indexed properties, otherwise known 
as the Temporal Properties Theory,15 and (2) objects bear time-indexed relations of possession 
to properties which are taken to be primitive, otherwise known as the Adverbial Theory of 
time.16 The leaf at autumn, according to the Temporal Properties Theory, is the three 
dimensional object which possesses the property of being-green-at-autumn, and according to 
the Adverbial Theory of time, is the three dimensional object which bears the relation of 
possession-at-autumn the property of being green. It is not hard to see how these two theories 
succeed in avoiding a run-up against the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals. As per 
the Temporal Properties Theory, properties are necessarily indexed to the times they are 
possessed, and temporal properties taken as such primitive complexes do not contradict each 
other. The property of being-green-at-autumn is compatibly possessed by the same leaf with 
the property of being-brown-at-winter. On the Adverbial Theory of time’s construal on the 
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 One advocate of such a view is Peter van Inwagen. See his “Four-Dimensional Objects”, from 
Ontology, Identity, and Modality (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 111-121. 
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 One advocate of such a view is Sally Haslanger. See her “Endurance and Temporary Intrinsics”, 
from Analysis, 41(3) (1989), pp. 119-125.   
The Notion of the Future | 
Page 59 | 
 
other hand, which posits that relations are necessarily indexed to the times they are 
instantiated, contrary properties are possessed by the same object but in different ways, and 
contradiction sets in only if contrary properties are possessed by the same object in the same 
way. The property of being green and the property of being brown is related to the same leaf 
in different ways, the former bearing the relation of being-possessed-at-autumn and the latter 
bearing that of being-possessed-at-winter. 
 
   What is there to choose between the above two versions of three-dimensionalism, however? 
The choice is that between thinking of properties as primitives in their own right, and thinking 
of relations being primitives instead. If we agree with David Lewis17 that we will like to think 
of something as just having a certain property, as opposed to having that property only insofar 
as we have it indexed to a time, then we may have reason to prefer the Adverbial Theory of 
time. On the other hand, if we prefer to think of relations as being primitives, then we will 
concur with the adherents to the Temporal Properties Theory. What is similar to both views is 
that unlike four-dimensionalism, the time has to be reported when we think of some object’s 
possession of some property. On the four-dimensionalist view, objects can bear the relation of 
possession simpliciter to properties simpliciter, but these objects are not the objects 
simpliciter, but temporal parts which make up the mereological wholes of objects simpliciter.  
 
   The Temporal Properties Theory and the Adverbial Theory of time are three-dimensionalist 
views, but are they, however, endurantist views? This is not so clear. Recall that endurantism 
posits that objects persist by being wholly present at more than one time. This is, however, a 
misleading way to characterize both the Temporal Properties Theory and the Adverbial 
Theory of time, for time is merely part of an index to objects and the properties they 
instantiate on these views. To think of the phrase ‘at more than one time’ in a more robust 
way than what these two views posit is to run the danger of reification of the concept of time 
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 See Lewis, D., “Rearrangement of Particles: Reply to Lowe”, from Analysis, 48(2) (1988), pp. 65-72. 
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to the point of committing oneself to an ontology which adherents to these two views will not 
agree with. This is because once we think of time more robustly than as parts of indices to 
property instantiation, and at the same time resist the four-dimensionalist view that objects 
have their temporal extents as essentially as their spatial extents, then we will be suggesting a 
view which locates three-dimensional objects in a four-dimensional world. This marriage will 
look like what I will term the ‘Replacement Theory’: objects, having only their spatial extents 
essentially, are momentarily existing entities. This means that objects come into existence and 
immediately go out of existence again, to be replaced by another object which comes into 
(and immediately out of) existence yet again. Change, on this view, will mean one of two 
things. If we think of the replacement object as the same object as the one which goes out of 
existence, then we come up against the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals head on, 
since the replacement object will have different properties than the object it is replacing. Also, 
we are faced with the problem, of no small magnitude, of accounting for just what it means 
for an object to have gone out of existence a moment ago and an object which has just come 
into existence at this moment of time to be the same object. These problems can be avoided if 
we posit that there is no time lapse between the point of time in which the first object goes out 
of existence and the point of time in which the replacement object comes into existence. This, 
however, will not improve the plausibility of this view, because if there is no time lapse, then 
replacement objects and the objects they are replacing will overlap with each other. As if 
running up against the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals is not bad enough, we 
also will be running up against the Law of Non-Contradiction and the Law of Excluded 
Middle, because the same object is both coming into and going out of existence at the same 
time. Also, the objects will fail to persist, because they will never exist at another moment in 
time than the one they have an overlapping existence in, due to their having zero temporal 
extent.  
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   If, on the other hand, we think of the replacement object as being distinct and being situated 
at a temporal distance from the object it is replacing, and if we also think of collections of the 
replaced and the replacing objects as being of added ontological significance such that these 
objects make up mereological wholes, then we avoid a violation of the Principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals, but we will be approximating towards a four-dimensionalist 
view. The only difference will be that we will be left without the idea that parts of 
mereological wholes are distinguished only arbitrarily, for distinctions between parts have no 
ontological significance on the four-dimensionalist view, and only help us in picking out 
when an object instantiates which properties, while distinctions between parts on the 
Replacement Theory are necessary given how they have zero temporal extent. At this point, it 
seems that a resistance to the four-dimensionalist view seems unmotivated, when we consider 
how we have no reason to think that Replacement Theory offers the correct description of 
persistence and change, over four-dimensionalism. Even though it avoids the violation of the 
Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, it posits what Judith Jarvis Thomson calls a 
“crazy metaphysic”:  
“I said this seems to me a crazy metaphysic. It seems to me that its full 
craziness only comes out when we take the spatial analogy seriously. The 
metaphysic yields that if I have had exactly one bit of chalk in my hand for 
the last hour, then there is something in my hand which is white, roughly 
cylindrical in shape, and dusty, something which also has a weight, 
something which is chalk, which was not in my hand three minutes ago, and 
indeed, such that no part of it was in my hand three minutes ago. As I hold 
the bit of chalk in my hand, new stuff, new chalk keeps constantly coming 
into existence ex nihilo. That strikes me as obviously false.”18 
The plausibility of the version of the Replacement Theory which avoids a violation of the 
Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals rests on a principled reason to posit constant 
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creation ex nihilo. If no such principled reason is forthcoming, it seems that one is better off 
accepting the more plausible four-dimensionalist picture of change and persistence.  
 
    At this point, the three-dimensionalist, reviewing her options, may not be satisfied with 
what there is on the table. She may still think that four-dimensionalism is unacceptable, and at 
the same time be dissatisfied with the Temporal Properties Theory, the Adverbial Theory of 
Time and the various versions of the Replacement Theory. She may then step back and 
confront the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, and point out that it is at odds with 
the commonsensical notion of change, which is the idea of objects, events and states of affairs 
taking on and discarding contrary properties over time. There is no problem with thinking that 
change happens when a three dimensional hunk of matter, persisting through time, acquire 
and shed its properties, and that the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals is operative 
only when we confront changeless states of affairs. The principle does not apply when we 
consider the phenomenon of change, because change is to be defined precisely at opposition 
to the principle in the first place.  
 
   This is a problematic suggestion. This is because, if we are to discard the Principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals when it comes to changing objects, events and states of affairs, 
we will thereby lose the ability to even characterize change itself. For if change is to be 
defined commonsensically as ‘the same object, event or state of affairs having contrary 
properties at different times’, how can we understand the term ‘the same object, event or state 
of affairs’? Faced with objects, events and states of affairs which possess different properties 
at different times, how are we to ascertain that we are dealing with the same objects, events 
and states of affairs instead of different ones which are just very similar to the ones before the 
supposed phenomenon of change has occurred? If we are to give up on the Principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals to save the commonsense concept of change, it seems that we 
will have to find a new way to characterize identity relations. This seems an overly large price 
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to pay because the Law of Identity and therefore the Principle of the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals are also commonsense notions as well, and probably are more fundamental to our 
thinking as applied to other concepts than the commonsense notion of change. With other 
ways of thinking about change being available, in both three- and four-dimensional guises, 
and with the Law of Identity being more widely accepted and harder to displace, it is perhaps 
more feasible to preserve the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals instead.  
 
   Let us now take stock of the debate between endurantism and perdurantism. It seems that, at 
this point, the only way to make sense of endurantism is by violating the Principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals, as per the suggestion given by the first variant of the 
Replacement Theory. This is because the second version of the Replacement Theory, as we 
have seen, posits not the same, but distinct three-dimensional objects persisting in different 
moments in time. Considering how going up against the Principle of the Indiscernibility of 
Identicals is an unattractive move, does this thereby mean that objects, events and states of 
affairs never endure, but can only perdure through time, if they persist at all? This hinges on 
whether or not we want to think of the Temporal Properties Theory and the Adverbial Theory 
of time as positions endorsing endurantism. Van Inwagen, who holds the former view, 
distances himself from the endurantist position, because he acknowledges that the concept of 
temporal extent does not have a place in the metaphysics of change (except if we are using the 
terms associated with temporal extent in a loose manner), owing to moments in time being 
just indices. In using Descartes as an example of an object in expounding his view, he writes:  
“Therefore, in [my] view, Descartes did not have a unique temporal extent. 
That is to say, he didn’t have a temporal extent at all; the concept of a 
temporal extent does not apply to Descartes or to any other object that 
persists or endures or exhibits identity across time. Thus, in saying that the 
philosopher who was hungry at t1 was a three-dimensional object, [I mean] 
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that he had a greater-than-zero extent in each of the three spatial dimensions 
– and that’s all.”19 
If the concept of a temporal extent does not apply to objects at all, as van Inwagen suggests, 
then it seems problematic to locate his view in the debate between endurantism and 
perdurantism which takes the idea of persistence as a given, where the idea of persistence 
seems to be predicated on a more robust view of time than van Inwagen suggests.  
 
   Haslanger, however, takes her position to describe an endurantist metaphysic, preferring to 
take talk involving existence at different times to be another way of characterizing an object’s 
relation to properties at different temporal indices. What is important to her is how the 
Adverbial Theory of time is an opposing position to take against perdurantism, on the grounds 
that the latter ill-characterizes the concept of persistence through change:  
“The fact that the doctrine of temporal parts conflicts with our ordinary 
beliefs (in the result that things do not strictly persist) is sometimes treated as 
a reductio of the position. But taken at face value, this basis for rejecting the 
view is unsatisfying. Since we have started with a conflict between a set of 
intuitively plausible beliefs, there is reason to think that any ‘workable’ 
solution will require some revision of these beliefs. If this is so, then why 
shouldn’t we revise the notion that things persist through change? In building 
philosophical theories there are usually trade offs; at the very least we should 
determine what this trade is costing us. Towards this end I consider the claim 
that objects persist through change to determine what is lost if we give it up, 
why it should matter to us at all. I argue that the notion that things persist 
through change is deeply embedded in ideas we have about explanation, and 
in particular, in the idea that the present is constrained by the past. To give up 
the idea that the past sets constraints on the present is to give up a key 
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element in an important, and perhaps essential, [strategy] in providing 
explanations of change.”20 
In a nutshell, Haslanger thinks that perdurantism ends us up with an altered notion of 
persistence so far removed from our notions concerning causation and explanation that it is 
too high a price to pay to explain change and persistence in this way.  
 
   In light of the difficulties associated with trying to pigeon-hole the Temporal Properties 
Theory and the Adverbial Theory of time when it comes to the debate between endurantism 
and perdurantism, and considering my requirements for this paper, it is perhaps neater to just 
consider what is plausible between four-dimensionalism and three-dimensionalism in 
accounting for change and persistence, because regardless of whether or not the above two 
views are endurantist views, they certainly posit a three-dimensional ontology: objects have 
only extension in the three spatial dimensions, and time is at issue only as an index which 
describes relations of these objects to the properties they instantiate. On the four-dimensional 
view, however, objects possess their temporal extents just as essentially as their spatial 
extents, and are composed mereologically of their temporal parts. The version of the 
Replacement Theory which does not violate the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Indexicals, 
on the other hand, posits three dimensional objects in a four dimensional world, and may be 
considered as a hybrid of the two views.  
 
   This brings an end to this section. To recapitulate, we have seen what is plausible and what 
is not when it comes to outlining an ontology which accounts for the phenomena of change 
and persistence. We have seen what are the ways in which we can think of objects, events and 
states of affairs, and more importantly, we have also seen how not to think of objects, events 
and states of affairs. In the next section, I will discuss the repercussions of our conclusions 
                                                          
20
 Haslanger, “Persistence, Change and Explanation”, from Philosophical Studies: An International 
Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 56(1) (1989), p. 2. 
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throughout this section on the debate between the reductionists and non-reductionists about 





§3: Future Selves. 
 
Future Selves | 








I have, in the above two sections, outlined the parameters of the problem at hand. In the first 
section, I presented various theories involving the idea of personal persistence over time, and 
how these theories are divided over how best, if at all, to come up with a justified special 
concern towards one’s future selves. I have also shown how the reductionists and the non-
reductionists with regard to the notion of personal persistence understand the justification of a 
special concern towards one’s special selves in different ways.  
 
   In the second section, I turned my attention towards metaphysical discussions involving 
time and change, and presented various doctrines about how time is to be thought about, and 
how persistence through change is to be understood. I have, in addition, also made clear just 
how we should not think about time and persistence, on pain of going up against the rate of 
passage objection, and violating the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, 
respectively.  
 
   With the above in place, I will now, in this section, investigate the legitimacy of the two 
brands of justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves, by 
scrutinizing them under the light of the ideas of time and persistence that we have looked at in 
the second section. I will argue that the type of justification for having a special concern 
towards one’s future selves offered by the non-reductionists concerning personal survival is a 
problematic one. I will then discuss the repercussions of this result for the debates concerning 
personal persistence.  
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I: Selves and Time. 
 
The question as to which account of a justification for having a special concern towards one’s 
future selves to accept will be predicated on the issue as to which accounts of future selves are 
feasible. We will now look at how and if the idea of there being future selves stands up to the 
views about time as discussed in the previous section, as well as to see if a reductionist or 
non-reductionist account of personal survival guarantees a justification for having a special 
concern for one’s future selves that is compatible with the resulting notion of future selves.  
 
   Presentism, as we have seen, admits of versions which adhere to or reject the truthmaker 
theory. Of the former versions, truthmakers may take the form of existing objects or 
subsisting ones. The version of presentism which agrees with the truthmaker theory and 
which takes truthmakers to be existing objects will therefore have to assert that statements 
about the past and the future are false, because these statements do not have truthmakers, due 
to the presentist doctrine which takes all which exist to exist in the present. This means that 
for this version of presentism, there are no such things as future selves.  
 
   On the Meinongian version of presentism, future selves do not exist, but they subsist, such 
as to make statements about them true or false. However, if the relationship between existing 
and subsisting selves is to be made sense of in terms of the Spotlight View of temporal 
presence, such that selves and other objects pass from subsistence to existence and back to 
subsistence again as the present moves and passes over them, then this account has to be 
rejected, as I have endeavored to show in the previous section. On the other hand, if 
Meinongian presentists reject the Spotlight View as well, then we are still left with the puzzle 
as to how we are to understand subsistence and to distinguish subsisting objects from mere 
possible objects. However, if a Meinongian presentist can come up with such a principled 
distinction, then the next question to ask is this: how are we to understand the relationship 
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between subsisting future selves and a present self, if the future selves are seen to survive the 
present self? If we are to keep to the Meinongian presentist’s insistence that only the present 
self exists, then it seems that we will have to say that the future selves will replace the present 
self, which will pass out of existence, in time to come. This means that Meinongian 
presentism will turn out to be a form of the Replacement Theory, which will be discussed in 
the next sub-section. 
 
   Bigelow’s version of presentism, on the other hand, seems to be a version of the Temporal 
Properties Theory, because, as we have seen, he takes the world to be a ‘changing ground of 
eternal truths’. The world, which is the set of true propositions, is a ‘changing ground’ 
because true propositions about the past, present and future change. In light of the change in 
true propositions, however, there are still the ‘eternal truths’ which the changing propositions 
are based on. This means that tensed sentences such as “Dinosaurs existed in the past” are 
based on tenseless sentences such as “There (tenselessly) are dinosaurs between the late 
Triassic period and the Cretaceous period”, which translates to “There (tenselessly) are 
dinosaurs-at-x”, where ‘x’ refers to the period of time between the late Triassic period and the 
Cretaceous period. Bigelow’s version of presentism is not a version of the Adverbial Theory 
of time because he takes true propositions about the past and future as world properties, 
properties which the world has in the present. This seems to suggest that he takes the 
instantiation of properties to be a primitive relation, and properties to be indexed to times. 
While this may be a debatable issue concerning Bigelow’s version of presentism, what is 
certain is that he situates his theory against four-dimensionalism1. I will therefore treat his 
version of presentism as three-dimensionalism, which will be discussed in the next sub-
section as well.  
    
                                                          
1
 See Bigelow, J., “Presentism and Properties”, from Noûs, 30, Supplement: Philosophical 
Perspectives, 10, Metaphysics, 1996 (1996), esp. p. 35 for his explicit denial of four-dimensionalism. 
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   This leaves us with the first version of presentism, which posits that future selves do not 
exist, only present ones do. This does not mean, however, that if this version of presentism is 
the ontologically correct theory of time, then the debate over which brand of justification for 
there being a special concern for one’s future selves is the correct one becomes undercut. This 
is because, on this debate, what is at question is not the actual existence of future selves, but 
an attitude which is taken towards perceived future selves. The question which arises, if this 
form of presentism is the correct metaphysical picture of time, is this: can we be justified in 
being concerned with how we will be, what will happen to us, and so on?  
 
   The answer must be a straightforward ‘no’ for the non-reductionist regarding personal 
survival. Recall that the reason why one is justified, on the non-reductionist account, in 
having a special concern for one’s future selves, is the fact that the two selves will house the 
same bare locus across two moments in time. I am justified in having a special concern 
towards the person sitting in the dentist chair tomorrow because I believe that that person is 
going to share the same bare locus with my present self, and also because that person will 
actually share the same bare locus with my present self. If there is no future bare locus 
because there is no future to speak of, then there can be no justification for having a special 
concern at all on the non-reductionist account. Now I can still possess a special concern 
towards a future self whom I believe will share the same bare locus as me, by disbelieving a 
presentist ontology, even if the first version of presentism illustrates the metaphysical truth 
about time, but this concern cannot be justified the way the non-reductionists regarding 
personal survival want it, because even if the concern is rooted in beliefs which may persist 
even if they are incompatible with metaphysical states of affairs, the justification for the 
concern, on the non-reductionist account, crucially hinges on the ontological status of future 
selves.  
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   Reductionists about personal survival, however, can still justify a special concern towards 
one’s future selves even if one does not actually have any future selves. This is because this 
special concern is a derivative affair for the reductionists, taking the form of an attitude which 
one takes, in the present moment, towards certain worries and anxieties which afflict her in 
the present moment as well. I may have present worries and anxieties directed towards what I 
believe to be my future self sitting in the dentist chair tomorrow who is psychologically 
continuous with my current self, and these worries and anxieties cause me to plan my next 
course of action which will result in the removal of these worries and anxieties, and this 
acting on my worries and anxieties is the special concern that I have for that perceived future 
self sitting in the dentist chair tomorrow. It is justified to have me concerned in such a way 
towards my future self, according to the reductionists about personal survival, because it is 
rational to act on present discomforts, including present worries and anxieties about a 
perceived future. Therefore, even if it turns out that the future does not exist, as per a 
presentist ontology of the first kind, I can still be justified in having a special concern for my 
future self in the dentist chair tomorrow, because both the concern and what grounds the 
justification for having such a concern are located in the present: the worries and anxieties 
that are afflicting me right now as I contemplate, mistakenly, about my visit to the dentist 
tomorrow.  
 
   So the non-reductionist about personal survival loses her justification for having a special 
concern towards her future selves on the picture of the metaphysics of time as given by the 
first version of presentism, because the latter posits that the future is unreal, whereas the 
former’s justification for there being a special concern towards one’s future selves requires 
the actual existence of future selves. Is the non-reductionist about personal survival on better 
grounds in some other metaphysical framework which posits that the future is real? 
Eternalism, in the way which I have presented it in the previous section, is one such doctrine 
which posits that past, present and future objects, events and states of affairs are all equally 
Future Selves | 
Page 73 | 
 
real, and nothing ontologically significant separates the three temporal determinations. If an 
eternalist ontology is the correct one, will the brand of justification for having a special 
concern towards one’s future selves as put forward by the non-reductionists with regards to 
personal survival be vindicated?  
 
   If past, present and future objects, events and states of affairs all exist, then it seems that we 
have a referent for ‘future selves’ unlike on the first presentist account whereby there is a 
problem with trying to find truthmakers for statements made about the past and the future. 
And so if my future self in the dentist chair tomorrow does exist, the non-reductionist about 
personal survival has at least avoided the problem set in place by a presentist metaphysic of 
the first kind. In addition, if this future self of mine is related to my current self in the way 
which the non-reductionist about personal survival posits, such that it makes sense for me to 
have a special concern for this future self, then it seems that the account of justification for 
having a special concern for one’s future selves as given by the non-reductionists concerning 
personal survival is compatible with an eternalist ontology. Whether or not such a relation is 
possible shall be discussed in the next sub-section.  
 
   Eternalism, however, does not just lend plausibility to the account of justification for a 
special concern towards one’s future selves as favoured by the non-reductionist concerning 
personal survival. The brand of justification offered by the reductionist about personal 
survival is equally compatible with such a metaphysic of time. That my future self actually 
does exist on this picture does nothing to my present possession of certain worries and 
anxieties which I am already justified in acting to remove. All that the actual existence of the 
future self sitting in the dentist chair means on this account is that the worries and anxieties 
are directed at such a future self. What is necessary for a justification for having a special 
concern towards future selves as described by the reductionist about personal survival, 
however, has got nothing to do with there being an object at which the worries and anxieties 
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are directed. What is required is just the possession of such worries and anxieties and a 
suitable state of mind of the present self such that it renders rational the plans for the removal 
of such worries and anxieties which characterize the special concern one has when faced with 
such worries and anxieties.  
 
   Of course, it may sometimes be the case that it will not be rational to remove such worries 
and anxieties directed towards one’s future selves – it may, for example, not be in my best 
interests to make plans to remove my worries and anxieties concerning my dentist visit 
tomorrow, by way of planning to miss my appointment, because I may be suffering greatly 
from a toothache now. This is because even though it may be rational to remove current 
worries and anxieties because they are discomfiting, so too is it rational to remove current 
pains as soon as possible by planning to go through with the dentist visit. In fact, my physical 
pain may be so great that the suffering which results from it outweighs any discomfort I 
experience from the worries and anxieties I have regarding the ordeal I will go through in the 
dentist chair tomorrow, and so if the only way to achieve a removal of my worries and 
anxieties is by way of telling myself that I will avoid the dentist chair tomorrow at all costs, it 
will be the rational course of action not to remove such worries and anxieties, for their 
removal will cause greater discomfort and suffering, and this realization causes me further 
present worries and anxieties on which it is rational to act as well. This does not mean, 
however, that it is therefore sometimes unjustified for one to have a special concern of the 
sort described by the reductionist concerning personal survival towards one’s future selves, 
because cases like this just illustrate a trumping of this justification by other concerns. I am 
still prima facie justified in having such a special concern for my future self sitting in the 
dentist chair tomorrow, but should not act on this justified special concern because I have 
other factors to consider, in this case my present pains arising from a terrible toothache. 
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   What of possibilism then? Is either or neither, or are both brands of justification for there 
being a special concern towards one’s future selves compatible with the Growing Universe 
Theory and/or the Diminishing Universe Theory? The defining feature of possibilist theories 
is an indeterminacy of future states of affairs, and as we have already seen how the 
reductionist about personal survival can ground her brand of justification for having a special 
concern towards one’s future selves on both the construal that the future exists and that the 
future does not exist, because her brand of justification is rooted in present states of affairs, 
and as possibilist theories agree with the existence of the present, we can conclude that the 
justification put forward by the reductionist concerning personal survival for having a special 
concern towards one’s future selves is compatible with possibilism as well. Whether or not 
possibilism is compatible with the justification put forward by the non-reductionist about 
personal survival, however, is another matter. We shall look at how the brand of justification 
squares up against the Growing Universe Theory and Diminishing Universe Theory in turn.  
 
   On the Growing Universe Theory, statements involving future objects, events and states of 
affairs have an indeterminate truth value because future objects, events and states of affairs do 
not exist yet. This means that, like how the first presentist ontology is incompatible with the 
sort of justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves as suggested by 
the non-reductionist concerning personal survival, the Growing Universe Theory is 
incompatible with this brand of justification as well. Because future selves do not exist, I 
cannot be justified with having a special concern for my future self sitting in the dentist chair 
tomorrow because that self will house the same bare locus as my present self. As already 
discussed in conjunction with the first form of presentism, the Growing Universe Theory, if 
right, takes away the justification for having a special concern towards my future self along 
the lines as described by the non-reductionist concerning personal survival, even if it fails to 
take away the special concern itself, due to perhaps deep-rooted irrational beliefs about future 
states of affairs.  
Future Selves | 
Page 76 | 
 
 
   The Diminishing Universe Theory, however, may offer the non-reductionist some solace 
concerning her suggestion of a justified special concern for one’s future selves. This is 
because the indeterminacy of future states of affairs is not so much due to the non-existence 
of future states of affairs, but is due to the fact that actual future states of affairs are not 
realized yet. What will actually be the case already exists – in fact what will actually not be 
the case exists too, at the present moment of time – and so the relationship of sharing the 
same bare locus with my future self already exists, if such a relationship can be made sense of 
in the first place. It is just that this relationship exists together with other relationships which 
exist as well, at this point of time, for example, that between my present self and a future self 
who misses the appointment at the dental clinic tomorrow and who will be in great agony 
suffering from the effects of a toothache I am already afflicted with now. The future exists, 
together with many other possible futures, and these actual and possible futures can ground a 
justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves the way the non-
reductionist want it, if future states of affairs can in fact ground such a justification. In fact, if 
one is a possibilist in the vein of the Diminishing Universe Theory, one may have plenty other 
justified special concerns for possible future selves, because of the attachment towards 
possibilia which may arise from being a modal realist, which is what a Diminishing Universe 
Theorist is, at least about possible future objects, events and states of affairs.  
 
   To summarize what has gone on in this sub-section, the only theories of time which do not 
conflict outright with the account of the justification for having a special concern towards 
one’s future selves as given by the non-reductionist with regards to personal survival are 
Meinongian and Bigelow’s versions of presentism, eternalism and the Diminishing Universe 
Theory, whereas the account of the justification for having a special concern towards one’s 
future selves as given by the reductionist about personal survival is compatible with all the 
theories of time which I have presented in the previous section. In the next sub-section, I will 
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argue that these remaining views will turn out to be incompatible ontologically with the 
account of justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves as given by 
the non-reductionist concerning personal survival after all. This is because, if we are to posit 
that the future exists or subsists, then objects, events and states of affairs will have to persist, 
if the idea of ‘future selves’ is to be coherent at all. However, the account of there being a 
justification for the special concern one has towards one’s future selves according to the non-
reductionist about personal survival is incompatible with any account of persistence I have 
presented.  
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II: Selves and Change. 
 
In order for there to be a coherent sense of the term ‘future selves’, we must take these future  
selves as persisting ones, with reference to present selves. In fact, the idea of personal survival 
itself is predicated on the idea that persons persist: they exist at more than one time, and that 
is what it means by a future self surviving a present and past self, which is that the same 
person exists at more than one time in the guises of the different selves. To be viable 
ontological platforms for the account of a justification for having a special concern towards 
one’s future selves as suggested by the non-reductionist concerning personal survival to stand 
on is to therefore be compatible with some theory of persistence. I will now take a look at 
four-dimensionalism and three-dimensionalism in turn, with regards to this issue. 
 
   Four-dimensionalism, as we have seen, posits that physical objects are extended in the 
temporal dimension as well as in the three spatial dimensions, and can be best made sense of 
by construing objects to persist by having temporal parts which constitute them 
mereologically. This means that different points in time contain not whole physical objects, 
but temporal parts of these objects, as the whole of these objects occupy the entire period of 
time in which they exist, and will be simply too big, in terms of their temporal extent, to exist 
in one point of time. Plugging this account of persistence into the non-reductionist account of 
personal survival will mean that bare loci persist, or exist in different moments of time, by 
having different temporal parts in different points of time.  
 
   If the above is true of bare loci, however, then it seems that the non-reductionist has lost her 
justification for there being a special concern towards one’s future selves. This is because 
pains which occur at different times are experienced by different temporal parts of 
mereologically, the ‘same’ bare loci, instead of the whole four-dimensional chunks which 
constitute the existence of whole bare loci. What is currently contemplating the visit to the 
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dentist tomorrow, strictly speaking, is not my whole four-dimensional self: the whole four-
dimensional hunk of matter which makes up the bare locus of my mentation or sensation has 
too large a temporal extent to be accurately characterized as actively contemplating my agony 
tomorrow. Mutatis mutandis, what will experience the excruciating pain tomorrow is also not, 
strictly speaking, the mereological whole that maps the existence of my whole bare locus, 
again because it is a categorical error to attribute a moment’s experience actively to 
something which has a temporal extent larger than that moment in which the experience takes 
place. Strictly speaking, what does the contemplating and the experiencing are the distinct 
temporal parts of the mereological whole which makes up the whole bare locus. But if the 
parts are distinct, then it can only mean that the non-reductionist account of there being a 
justified special concern for my future self breaks down. This is because my current self qua 
temporal part of my whole four-dimensional bare locus is worrying over a distinct future self 
qua temporal part of the same four-dimensional whole. If the temporal parts are distinct, why 
then am I justified in having a special concern towards that temporal part experiencing the 
pain tomorrow? Just because that temporal part will be a part of the same mereological whole 
of which my current self is also a part? But if that is the case then it is an extrinsic fact about 
both my current self and my future self which is operative behind this concern, because the 
relations between parts of a mereological whole are extrinsic relations. Nothing intrinsic to 
my current self or future self makes us parts of the same mereological whole, because we are 
different temporal parts of the same person, and not the same person simpliciter. Langsam, 
who endorses a non-reductionist account of personal survival, identifies this problem for a 
four-dimensionalist rendering of non-reductionism about personal survival:  
“Can the fact that I stand in the [mereological] relation with some subject 
actually count as a justifying reason for my special concern for that subject’s 
pain? I submit not. Recall that what was problematic about Reductionist 
accounts in this context was precisely that they took the existence of the self 
to consist in the holding of certain kinds of relations between certain kinds of 
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events. The [four-dimensional] version of the Non-Reductionist account is no 
better off in this regard: it takes the existence of the self over time to consist 
in the holding of a certain kind of relation, the [mereological] relation, 
between certain kinds of momentarily existing things ([temporal parts of bare 
loci of mentation or sensation]). Why is talk of relations problematic here? 
Because if I accept the view that the existence of the self over time consists 
merely in the holding of certain kinds of relations, either between certain 
kinds of events (Reductionism), or between certain kinds of momentarily 
existing things ([four-dimensionalist] Non-Reductionism), then my concern 
that a future pain is mine turns out to be a concern with an extrinsic feature of 
the pain. In the case of [four-dimensionalist] Non-Reductionism, it is a 
concern that the subject that feels the pain is copersonal with the subject that 
I am now. But as noted earlier, our commonsense view is that my special 
concern for some future pain of mine is a concern solely with an intrinsic 
feature of the pain, its intrinsic feel, and to the fact that this intrinsic feel will 
be experienced by me; it is not a concern that I am related in some way to the 
distinct entity that will feel the pain.”2 
Can the above problem be solved if we simply stipulate that the fact that my current and 
future selves are parts of the same mereological whole is an intrinsic fact about both selves, 
instead of it being an extrinsic relation shared by both selves? This is a problematic 
suggestion on two counts. Firstly, recall that, on the non-reductionist account of personal 
survival, the fact that the two selves at the different times are the same surviving self is due to 
the fact that some intrinsic feature about these selves guarantees this survival, and this 
intrinsic feature has been identified as the two selves housing the same bare locus. If the 
sameness of the bare locus across time is due again to some other intrinsic feature, because of 
the nature of non-reductionism about personal survival characterized in a four-dimensionalist 
                                                          
2
 Langsam, H., “Pain, Personal Identity, and the Deep Further Fact”, from Erkenntnis, 54 (2001), pp. 
264-265. 
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fashion, then it looks like the four-dimensionalist non-reductionist is on her way to an infinite 
series of appeals to underlying intrinsic features. Secondly, if we take it as an unanalyzable 
primitive fact that temporal parts of bare loci share mysterious intrinsic features which 
guarantee the sameness relation between explicitly different temporal parts, then it seems that 
we are not saying anything more than what reductionist accounts of personal survival say, 
accounts which seem to fit better with a four-dimensionalist ontology, by construing survival 
conditions as extrinsic relations between selves at different times.  
 
   So the four-dimensionalist account of persistence is not compatible with non-reductionist 
accounts of personal survival, and hence cannot serve as an ontological platform for the 
account of justification for there being a special concern towards one’s future selves as given 
by the non-reductionists. This, as mentioned, is noted even by non-reductionists such as 
Langsam. However, Langsam thinks that this state of affairs just means that we should 
therefore jettison a four-dimensionalist metaphysic and turn to a three-dimensionalist one 
instead. He writes: 
“According to the [three-dimensionalist] account, my concern that some 
future pain is mine is not a concern with any extrinsic feature of the pain, it 
literally is a concern with the intrinsic feel of the pain, and with the fact that 
this intrinsic feel will be experienced by me. For according to the [three-
dimensionalist] account, the subject that experiences that pain in the dentist’s 
chair tomorrow is numerically identical to the subject that I am now. I am 
wholly present now, and I will be wholly present then.”3 
To be fair, Langsam utilizes the talk of perdurantism and endurantism to characterize the 
different ontological platforms which may support or undermine non-reductionism. But as we 
have seen in the earlier section, the language of perdurantism and endurantism is difficult to 
navigate, as the idea of endurantism is itself a confused notion. What is important, however, is 
                                                          
3
 Ibid. p. 266. 
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that four-dimensionalism is straightforwardly a perdurantist doctrine, and that Langsam sees a 
difficulty in the marriage between non-reductionism concerning personal survival and 
perdurantism. This means that if non-reductionism concerning personal survival is to have 
any ontological grounding at all, it will be on the three-dimensionalists’ terms, be the 
resulting metaphysic an endurantist one or otherwise. Will such an appeal to a three-
dimensionalist ontology, however, ground a justification for having a special concern towards 
one’s future selves as suggested by the non-reductionist concerning personal survival? Such 
an appeal, I submit, cannot be successful, if we are to look at the plausible versions of three-
dimensionalism. I will now take a look at the Temporal Properties Theory, the Adverbial 
Theory of time and the Replacement Theory in turn, with regards to how they are to be 
combined with non-reductionism concerning personal persistence.  
 
   According to the Temporal Properties Theory, for something to have a property at a certain 
moment of time just means that that something has a certain time-indexed property. For me to 
have the property of being in pain tomorrow just means that I have the property of being-in-
pain-at-t2, where t2 is the date of my dentist visit. However, the fact that I do have such a 
time-indexed property is always true, reading ‘always’ in a three-dimensionalist way which 
does not take time to constitute another physical dimension, but just as part of an index. I 
have all my time-indexed properties laid out in my existence, if I have any of them at all, 
because I am extended in the three spatial dimensions, and that is all. Mapping this onto the 
non-reductionist view of personal persistence, we have the resultant fact that bare loci have all 
their time-indexed properties laid out in their three-dimensional existence, and that is all. 
However, if bare loci are to be thought of in this manner, then the non-reductionist concerning 
personal survival will not have her brand of a justified concern towards one’s future selves 
validated. This is because the fact of my being in the dentist chair tomorrow, if it is a fact 
which is just realized by my having certain temporal properties, is a fact which is true 
whenever it can be said that the fact that I exist is true. Why am I then justified in bearing 
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concern towards the fact that I will have the time indexed property of being-in-pain-at-t2, 
whether the concern is special or otherwise? If it is true that I will be in pain in the dentist 
chair at a certain time, then it is true at any and all times, either before, during, or after the 
dentist visit. Yet no one will claim that I have a justified special concern for my past selves in 
the same way as I have the special concern for my future selves. 
 
   The situation is similar when we consider the Adverbial Theory of time. According to this 
theory, the instantiation of properties is not to be thought of as the relation between objects 
and time-indexed properties, but as time-indexed relations between objects and properties. 
For me to be in pain in the dentist chair tomorrow is for me to bear the relation of having-at-t2 
the property of being in pain. This means that I will be in pain in a certain way, or that I will 
be in pain t2-ly. If we are to read the Adverbial Theory of time in a three-dimensionalist way, 
as I have done in the preceding section, then I can be said to bear all my time-indexed 
relations to the various properties I instantiate throughout my existence whenever it can be 
said that I exist. Plugging this into the non-reductionist view concerning personal survival, 
this means that bare loci bear all their time-indexed relations to the properties they instantiate 
throughout their existence, whenever it can be said that they exist. If this is so, then a concern 
for my future self cannot be justified, which is the same problem that is faced by mapping the 
Temporal Properties Theory onto a non-reductionism concerning personal persistence.  
 
   This leaves us with the Replacement Theory which avoids the problem with the Principle of 
the Indiscernibility of Identicals. Does it fare better as an account of change and persistence 
which gives support to the brand of justification for having a special concern towards one’s 
future selves as proposed by the non-reductionists with regards to personal survival? Recall 
that in the earlier section I pointed out that this version of the Replacement Theory looks a lot 
like a four-dimensionalist view, because it agrees with four-dimensionalism that time exists as 
a separate physical dimension, only objects do not have any temporal extent. Objects at 
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different times are distinct three-dimensional hunks of matter, and that is all, and their 
persistence is cashed out in mereological terms. If this is the case, then it should be clear that 
whatever applies to four-dimensionalism which is incompatible with the version of the 
justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves as given by the non-
reductionists concerning personal survival will apply to the Replacement Theory as well. 
Because identity across different moments of time in an object’s lifetime can only be cashed 
out, on this view, in terms of extrinsic relations between different three-dimensional objects 
which make up a mereological whole, it will not serve as an appropriate account of the 
metaphysics of change and persistence to ground such a justification, which requires the 
holding of the same intrinsic properties across time instead.  
 
   Even if future objects, events and states of affairs subsist or exist so as to get the brand of 
justification for having a special concern for one’s future selves as given by the non-
reductionists concerning personal persistence off the ground, we still are left with no 
ontological support for such a justification. This is because the nature of change and 
persistence as illustrated by the various theories which take the future to be real are at odds 
with what is required by such a form of justification as required by the non-reductionists 
concerning personal survival. In the next sub-section, I will take a look at what is needed for a 
justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves according to the non-
reductionist about personal survival, and discuss why such a need cannot be plausibly 
fulfilled.
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III: What is Needed. 
 
What makes the sort of justification for having a special concern towards one’s future selves 
as given by the non-reductionist concerning personal persistence seem plausible? It is the idea 
that we are identical with our future selves in the sense that we are the ones who are 
contemplating our future selves’ fates and who will also be suffering these selves’ fates. I am 
thinking right now of my visit to the dentist tomorrow, and I have a special concern for my 
future self in that dentist chair tomorrow, a special concern which I have only towards my 
future selves and not the selves of other people, whether these selves are situated in the past, 
present or future, because I think myself to be the one experiencing that pain tomorrow.  
 
   What sort of ontology do we need for the seemingly commonsensical intuition described 
above to be made possible? How can it be that the self who is looking into the future with fear 
is the same as the self who will be experiencing the pain tomorrow, in the sense of ‘same’ 
which validates the justification for having a special concern for my future self according to 
the non-reductionist? It will mean that underlying all the changes that will occur to me from 
now till tomorrow will be an unchanging thing with which both today’s and tomorrow’s 
selves is to be identified. This I, who cannot be a complex of physical, psychological or 
phenomenal entities, for the reason that these do not remain the same over time because they 
exhibit only extrinsic relations with their neighbours over time, must be that which enables 
the possession of physical, mental and phenomenal qualities over time. I am justified, on this 
view, to be specially concerned for my future self in the dentist chair tomorrow because I am 
the unchanging bare locus towards which my fears today and experiences tomorrow are 
directed. As time passes and a myriad of changes takes place, I am still that same self 
characterizing every moment of my existence, in the sense that I am this unchanging bare 
locus which acquires and sheds properties over time, be the properties temporal ones or 
otherwise.  
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   This above picture, however, is an implausible one, as it is a version of the Spotlight View 
which we have found reasons to reject. The ‘I’ in this case is seen to be like the spotlight 
which shines on different things as it moves over its patrol area, or at least is closely related to 
the spotlight such that it remains unchanged over the course of the illumination: maybe the ‘I’ 
can be seen as the operator of the spotlight or the helicopter or the helicopter pilot; these 
tweaks to the analogy do not matter here. One tweak we cannot make if we are to remain a 
non-reductionist concerning personal survival with regards to the having of a justified concern 
towards our future selves is to construe the ‘I’ as the collection of objects, events and states of 
affairs which the spotlight of the present shines on over time. This is because once persons are 
seen to be mereologically composed over time, the non-reductionist concerning personal 
persistence will have lost her justification for having a special concern towards one’s future 
selves. In any case, tweaking of the analogy in the above fashion or otherwise, the Spotlight 
View in any guise is susceptible to the objection we have already seen in the preceding 
section, and should rightly be rejected on account of that.  
 
   Is the Spotlight View rendering of the commonsense intuition the only possible one? Is 
there any other plausible ontological picture on which the commonsense intuition that we do 
have a special concern for our future selves the way non-reductionists concerning personal 
survival have outlined can be anchored? Perhaps persons can be seen as ever-changing bare 
loci over time. This means that I am the same person both fearing for my pains today and 
experiencing those pains tomorrow, in the sense of being an ever-changing self over time. 
This picture will mean a removal of the spotlight in the above Spotlight View and see persons 
as mereological wholes of the temporal parts which compose them.  
 
   This above picture can be interpreted in two ways. On the first interpretation, to say that the 
self contemplating tomorrow’s pain now and the self experiencing tomorrow’s pain are the 
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same self which is ever-changing is to say that what we take to be the same object turns out to 
have different features, properties or aspects, or stands in different relations to different 
objects, events and states of affairs. This, however, means that this first interpretation 
commits us to a rejection of the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals, because this will 
be a version of the first version of the Replacement Theory we have seen in the preceding 
section. We have already found reason to reject views which go up against the Principle of the 
Indiscernibility of Identicals, however, and so this way of understanding the above suggestion 
is to be rejected based on the reasons already given in the preceding section.  
 
   On the second interpretation, to say that the self contemplating tomorrow’s pain now and 
the self experiencing tomorrow’s pain are the same self which is ever-changing is to say that 
these selves are different, but are parts of the same whole, and that is the sense in which the 
sameness relation which holds between these disparate selves across time is to be understood. 
This means that persons, viewed across time, are mereological collections of their temporal 
parts, or selves which are taken to be parts of them at the different points of time 
characterizing their existence. Persons are ever-changing on this interpretation because they 
are composed of more and more parts over time. This, however, means that this second 
interpretation commits us to a rejection of the non-reductionist view of personal survival, 
because nothing intrinsic thereby grounds a person’s survival. Persistence in this case, as we 
have seen in the preceding section on four-dimensionalism, is taken to be a matter of extrinsic 
relations between different entities, in this case the different temporal parts of persons which 
are the selves at the different points of time characterizing the persons’ existence.  
 
   What I have done in this sub-section is to consider just what sort of an ontological picture 
needs to be painted in order for the non-reductionist concerning personal survival to validate 
her version of the having of a justified special concern towards one’s future selves. As shown 
above, if we are to remain non-reductionists concerning personal persistence, we will end up 
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with unsavoury problems trying to come up with a plausible ontological anchor to ground the 
sort of justification for being specially concerned with future selves as favoured by the non-
reductionists about personal survival. In order for the commonsensical intuition which 
favours the non-reductionist story concerning personal survival to be validated, the challenge 
will be for the non-reductionists to 1) come up with a metaphysical picture which will make 
plausible their views concerning personal survival and a justified special concern for one’s 
future selves, 2) decisively challenge the objection to the Spotlight View, 3) tell us what is 
wrong with the Principle of the Indiscernibility of Identicals and come up with a competing 
criterion or criteria for identity relations across time, or 4) accomplish two or all of the above.  
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IV: Personal Survival and the ‘Special Concern’, Again. 
 
My contention in this paper has been that the idea of a justified special concern towards one’s 
future selves as provided by the non-reductionist concerning personal persistence is a 
problematic one, not because of any internal incoherence in the idea, but because no plausible 
metaphysical theory will accommodate such an idea. I will now look at some consequences 
arising from this state of affairs.  
 
   The first consequence concerns the debate over the nature of personal survival. The idea of 
there being a justified special concern for our future selves arose as a motivating factor on the 
side of the adherents to non-reductionist views concerning personal persistence. The 
unpalatable notion of an un(der)-defined bare locus which, by its nature, resists all attempts to 
reduce personal survival to some fact or other, may well be mitigated and accepted by the 
need to account for such a phenomenon as our special concern towards our future selves. If it 
is the case, however, that this account of a special concern for our future selves cannot be 
justified the way non-reductionists concerning personal survival want it, or that an account of 
a justified special concern for our future selves given by the non-reductionists concerning 
personal survival is ultimately metaphysically problematic, as has been shown in this paper; 
and that an account of a justified special concern for our future selves can be given as well on 
the construal of the reductionist concerning personal persistence, as has been shown by John 
Perry as mentioned in the first section of the paper; then it will seem that we have lost some 
motivation to be non-reductionists concerning personal survival. While support for the 
position by way of its brand of accounting for special concern towards one’s future selves has 
been found questionable, the criticisms directed towards it regarding its positing of 
mysterious non-definable entities remain. Reductionists concerning personal survival, on the 
other hand, while avoiding the charge of obscurantism by steering clear of mysterious entities 
in accounting for personal persistence, are in good shape as they have the means to justifiably 
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account for the possession of a special concern towards one’s future selves without running 
afoul of the metaphysics of change and time, by helping themselves to Perry’s account, a 
justified account which was formerly judged to be lacking in reductionist theories about 
personal survival. 
 
   One thing to take note at this point is that the failure of what I have called the account of 
there being a justified special concern towards one’s future selves as favoured by the non-
reductionist concerning personal persistence to be accommodated by any of the contemporary 
theories regarding change and time, does not thereby constitute a knock-down argument 
against non-reductionist views concerning personal survival. Certainly, this failure does not 
mean that non-reductionism about personal survival is itself a metaphysically untenable 
position. This is because the non-reductionists about personal survival can also help 
themselves to Perry’s account of a justified special concern towards one’s future selves. The 
reason why Perry’s account does not suffer, metaphysically, as the other account does, is that 
it is not an account which is predicated on identity relations over time. Instead, the account 
collapses what explains and justifies a special concern for one’s future selves into the same 
moment of time as the occurrence of the special concern. This avoids problems with time and 
the phenomenon of change we see facing the other account. The adoption of Perry’s account 
of a justified special concern towards one’s future selves by the non-reductionists concerning 
personal survival, however, does not remove the charge of obscurantism leveled at their 
position. What the argument I have presented means for non-reductionists concerning 
personal survival is that they should focus their energies in dispelling the charge of 
obscurantism against their position and grapple with a point against their position, instead of 
pointing out that theirs is a position better suited to account for the phenomenon that is the 
arising of a special concern towards one’s future selves and argue for a point in favour of their 
position, an argument which will fail due to issues concerning the metaphysics of time and 
change, as I have endeavored to show. If this is not forthcoming, then we can 1) accept non-
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reductionism about personal survival and its obscurantist baggage, 2) reject non-reductionism 
about personal survival due to its obscurantist consequence, or 3) find other arguments to 
either augment the non-reductionist position by making its obscurantist consequence easier to 
swallow or weaken the reductionist position.  
 
   A second consequence is that concerning other emotions of the same class as those we find 
characterizing special concern towards our future selves. As much as issues concerning 
forward-looking emotions such as special classes of anxiety and fears cannot be used to 
support non-reductionist accounts of personal survival as I have endeavored to show, so too 
are backward-looking emotions such as special classes of relief, shame and guilt inadequate 
when it comes to validating non-reductionist accounts of personal survival. As much as such 
relief, shame and guilt are directed at past objects, events and states of affairs, we can be said 
to be justified in having them by collapsing them into the present. I can be justified in feeling 
relief, for example, about a past visit to the dentist, because I believe of myself to have been 
suffering in the dentist’s chair the day before and am glad that my present self entertains no 
such suffering anymore. What warrants this relief is not that the state of my consciousness is 
such that it flowed from a past state which featured the suffering to the present one which 
does not, but that my present state does not feature any suffering as compared to a believed 
past state which contains anguishing pain and suffering. A derivative account of relief sees 
my relief as rationally had because I am presently able to continue with my various projects 
and plans undeterred by great pain and suffering to which I believe myself to have been 
subject. 
 
   The above move to explain emotions of relief by recourse to beliefs about the past, as 
opposed to past states of affairs themselves, is one that has been made in discussions over the 
metaphysics of time, in relation to debates surrounding what is known as the ‘Thank 
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Goodness That’s Over’ argument, first propounded by Arthur Prior,4 who argued that 
eternalists cannot adequately account for such feelings as relief in a state of affairs that has 
passed, because such emotions can only be justifiably explained by giving place to the idea of 
the passage of objects, events and state of affairs in time. Responses to Prior have taken forms 
which point out that such emotions as relief can justifiably be had not by conceding the 
existence of metaphysical passage, but that the belief in the passage of time5 or the acceptance 
of a language which accommodates talk of the passage of time6 is sufficient to explain and 
justify someone’s claim to such emotions as relief, guilt and shame. Perry’s and therefore, as 
regards the issue of personal persistence, the reductionist’s account of a justified derivative 
special concern for one’s future selves can be further bolstered by considering such 
distinctions as that between conceding the reality of metaphysical passage and belief in 
metaphysical passage, as well as that between conceding the reality of metaphysical passage 
and accepting a language which accommodates talk about the passage of time. In return, 
objectors to Prior’s argument can take Perry’s spirit of collapsing emotions which seem to be 
directed towards objects, events and states of affairs located at other times into the same 
moment of time as the emotions are being had, to further push the point that such emotions 
can be justifiably had regardless of the ontological view about time and change one accepts, 
and that therefore an appeal to such emotions can neither strengthen nor weaken the 
plausibility of competing metaphysical views about time and change.  
 
   This brings us to a last, general consequence of the results of my discussion. It has 
sometimes been suggested that metaphysical discussions never affect how we live and how 
we act, that they are just frameworks that are compatible with how we act and how we live 
our lives. Metaphysical theories which contradict the above are commonly thought of as 
implausible (a case in point being metaphysical solipsism), for the general sentiment is that 
                                                          
4
 Prior, A. N., “Thank Goodness That’s Over”, from Philosophy, 34(128) (1959), pp. 12-17.  
5
 See MacBeath, M., “Mellor’s Emeritus Headache”, from Ratio, 25 (1983), pp. 81-88. 
6
 See Garrett, B. J., “‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’ Revisited”, from Philosophical Quarterly, 39 
(1988), pp. 201-205. 
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metaphysical theories should attempt to explain the phenomena we are exposed to in 
everyday life, instead of undermining them. By looking at the various metaphysical theses 
concerning time and change in my paper so far, however, I have formulated an argument 
against one aspect of a prominent position in the debates concerning personal survival, and 
that is the non-reductionist view. If the non-reductionists about personal survival have no 
answer to this, and if they are unable to come up with more of a positive motivation to believe 
in their position, then it seems that we have gone some way in eliminating a prominent 
position in the debate concerning personal survival, and that reductionist theories of personal 
survival are to be accepted instead. This will mean two things: 1) We should think of our 
emotions in other ways than those we are accustomed to; specifically, we should think of 
emotions as concern for our future, as well as relief, shame and guilt about our past, as being 
derivative affairs based on present goals and projects as they are affected by present 
discomforts; and 2) We should adopt the reductionist view concerning personal persistence, 
which will mean an acceptance that extrinsic relations to future and past selves exhaust 
identity conditions over time. With regards to (1), this will mean a shift in our thinking and 
understanding of our emotions, and this is certainly something psychological theories about 
our emotions can build on. As regards (2), this way of thinking about our past and future is 
liable to lead to attitudinal changes not unlike those which led to Parfit’s (in)famous claim I 
pointed out in the first section of the paper. If our survival over time is guaranteed only by 
extrinsic relations we hold with other objects distinct from our present selves, then it seems 
that we have lost any reason to retain any attachment to our future selves, apart from those 
relevant to the accomplishment of our present goals and projects. And if it is the case that we 
are forced to accept there is no real reason for such attachment, then, if we are to be rational 
and consistent beings, we should at least attempt to remove any such attachment.  
 
   This does not mean, however, that any drastic changes should be made to our mindset along 
the lines of adopting reckless habits and having a bleaker outlook towards life. This is because 
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even though we do not have a direct concern for our future selves, we nevertheless do have 
derivative concerns for such future selves. Thus, even though I do not have a reason to be 
concerned with a future self just because that is my future self, I still have a justified reason 
for being concerned with that future self because he will be the most suitable self in the 
future, with regards to such qualities as ability and outlook, who will accomplish the goals 
and projects I have deemed worthy of completion now. What we should expect is, instead, 
subtle alterations to our mindsets in adopting less ego-centric and selfish worldviews, as 
Parfit observes, when he switched from a belief in a non-reductionist view to a belief in a 
reductionist view about personal survival:  
“Is the truth depressing? Some may find it so. But I find it liberating, and 
consoling. When I believed that my existence was […] a further fact, I 
seemed imprisoned in myself. My life seemed like a glass tunnel, through 
which I was moving faster every year, and at the end of which there was 
darkness. When I changed my view, the walls of my glass tunnel 
disappeared. I now live in the open air. There is still a difference between my 
life and the lives of other people. But the difference is less. Other people are 
closer. I am less concerned about the rest of my own life, and more 
concerned about the lives of others.”7 
What is more, such an alteration in mindset and outlook towards life may have repercussions 
in discussions about what is commonly known as ‘philosophy and the good life’, as Parfit 
continues regarding the topic of death:  
“When I believed in the Non-Reductionist View, I also cared more about my 
inevitable death. After my death, there will [be] no one living who will be 
me. I can now redescribe this fact. Though there will later be many 
experiences, none of these experiences will be connected to my present 
experiences by chains of such direct connections as those involved in 
                                                          
7
 Parfit, D., Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 281. 
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experience-memory, or in the carrying out of an earlier intention. Some of 
these future experiences may be related to my present experiences in less 
direct ways. There will later be some memories about my life. And there may 
later be thoughts that are influenced by mine, or things done as the result of 
my advice. My death will break the more direct relations between my present 
experiences and future experiences, but it will not break various other 
relations. This is all there is to the fact that there will be no one living who 
will be me. Now that I have seen this, my death seems to me less bad.”8 
Some who read this may balk at and remain skeptical about Parfit’s dramatic claims, but it 
will be undeniable that a belief in the reductionist picture of personal persistence will be liable 
to at least move one to accept an anti-ego-centric moral as a rational one, if not to adopt such 
a moral as her own guiding principle in living her life out, if such an adoption is even possible 
in the first place. 


















The objective of my paper has been to discredit a particular version of an account for the 
having of a special concern towards one’s future selves, a version which has been brought 
forward to motivate the acceptance of a non-reductionist account of personal survival. The 
means I have utilized to make my point is to take a look at contemporary metaphysical 
theories concerning time and change, see if they provide an ontological framework with 
which to make sense of such an account of justified special concern, and then to point out that 
none of the plausible metaphysical theories is compatible with what is needed for such an 
account.  
 
   As I have pointed out, this conclusion by no means signals an end to the debates concerning 
personal survival. On the one hand, non-reductionists may devise a comeback either by 
showing my argument to be invalid, or by offering a metaphysical framework which both 
avoids the pitfalls I have gestured to that will put a dent in the plausibility of such frameworks 
concerning time and change, and accommodates the ingredients necessary for the account of 
justified special concern towards one’s future selves as I have described as being favoured by 
them to work. On the other hand, if my argument is shown to have some force in drawing 
support away from the non-reductionist camp in matters concerning personal persistence, 
work still remains to be done in adjudicating between the various reductionist accounts of 
personal survival. Decisions still have to be made concerning whether to accept the bodily 
continuity, psychological continuity, or phenomenal continuity account of personal survival, 
and which version of each account to accept. A more in-depth study of the above, however, 
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escapes the modest boundaries of this paper, but the driving of the attention to such a study, 
instead of having writers still agonizing over the debate concerning a justified concern for 
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